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A Systematic Scoping Review of Climate Finance Law in Guyana: 
Opportunities and Challenges within the Context of Significant 
Oil Discoveries 
Katrien Steenmans* 
Abstract 
Guyana is particularly vulnerable to climate change and its effects. It is highly susceptible to 
rising sea levels and flooding, as a result of much of its population living at or below sea 
level, and its worn coastal infrastructure. Guyana’s government has recognised the urgency 
of addressing climate change but identified its limited financial capacity to take climate 
adaptation and mitigation actions. Nevertheless, it has adopted some law and policy 
initiatives to enable increased public and private climate finance. Simultaneously, laws and 
policies exist to financially enable exploration and production of significant oil resources 
recently discovered, even though oil exploration and production are a major driver of 
climate change. This article presents a scoping review, facilitated by Bowman’s (2018) Legal 
Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options, of climate finance law in Guyana and the 
possible tensions that exist with laws and policies for the purpose of financing the 
exploration and production of oil discoveries. The wider contribution of this article is 
therefore to the emerging field of climate finance law by reviewing the Guyanese experience 
to date. 
1. Introduction 
Climate change is expected to have wide-ranging impacts – from rising sea levels, to more 
frequent and longer-lasting heat waves, to more extreme precipitation events.1 Mitigating and 
adapting to climate change is thus essential, but this will require significant financial 
resources. This need has been widely recognised at international level; the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change2 (UNFCCC) regime aims to mobilise USD 100 
billion annually by 2020 for climate mitigation and adaptation,3 though this falls short of the 
estimated required amounts by other organisations. The Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate, for example, estimates that USD 90 trillion investment in infrastructure is 
needed,4 and the International Energy Agency estimates investment of USD 13.5 trillion in 
energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies by 2030 is required to meet current climate 
pledges.5 
 
* Lecturer in Law, Coventry Law School, and Research Associate, Centre for Business in Society, Coventry 
University, katrien.steenmans@coventry.ac.uk 
1 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R K Pachauri and 
L A Meyer (eds)] (IPCC 2014) 10. 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bonn, 4 June 1992; in force 21 March 1994) UN 
Doc FCCC/INFORMAL/84. 
3 This commitment was first made in 2009 at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen: UN 
Decision 2/CP.15 (Copenhagen Accord) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, art 8. 
4 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, The Sustainable Infrastructure Imperative: Financing 
for Better Growth and Development (The New Climate Economy 2016) 23. 
5  International Energy Agency, Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special Briefing for 
COP21 (OECD/IEA 2015) 4. 
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The Co-operative Republic of Guyana (Guyana) is particularly vulnerable to climate change 
and its effects. It is, for example, highly susceptible to rising sea levels and flooding, as a 
result of almost 80% of its population living at or below sea level, its worn coastal 
infrastructure, sea level along the Guyanese coastline rising faster than the global average (its 
capital, Georgetown, already relies on seawalls for protection), and almost all of its 
agricultural production being on the coastal plain.6 The resultant consequences of increased 
sea level and flooding are anticipated to include detrimental impacts on human health through 
the contamination of potable water and increased incidence of diseases, and on agriculture, 
one of the most productive sectors of Guyana’s economy, through flooding of valuable 
agricultural land.7 The Government projects that the required adaptation costs alone of these 
anticipated impacts could be in excess of USD 1 billion,8 which is equivalent to almost one 
third of Guyana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 9  In recognition of this, Guyana has 
emphasised the need for financial support in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). 
NDCs are a requirement by Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement within the UNFCCC10 that 
communicate the efforts by each country to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions and 
adapt to climate change. Moreover, Guyana has taken law and policy actions to help address 
the need for climate finance as discussed in this article. 
Alongside the advancements in climate awareness, there have been significant discoveries of 
oil resources estimated to exceed five billion barrels of oil equivalent in Guyana.11 These 
discoveries are expected to almost triple Guyana’s GDP and are hoped to strengthen 
education, healthcare, and infrastructure for the Guyanese,12 including the more than 36% of 
Guyanese that live in poverty. 13  Within the context of climate change, however, such  
6 Co-operative Republic of Guyana, ‘Initial National Communication in Response to its Commitments to the 
UNFCCC’ (April 2002) 75 and 80 <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/guync1.pdf> accessed 19 July 2019; 
ECLAC, ‘An Economic Impact Assessment of Climate Change in Guyana – Agriculture, Coastal and Human 
Settlements and Health Sectors’ (2011) 4 FOCUS Newsletter of the Cooperation and Development Committee 
1, 1-2; Office of Climate Change, Office of the President, ‘Impacts of Climate Change on Guyana and the 
World at Large. Part 2: Impacts of Future Climate Change’ (n.d.) 2-3 
<www.lcds.gov.gy/index.php/documents/climate-change-information/understanding-climate-change/235-
understanding-climate-change-impacts-of-climate-change-on-guyana-and-the-world-at-large-part-2-impacts-of-
future-climate-change/file> accessed 19 July 2019. 
7 ibid. 
8 Office of the President, Republic of Guyana, A Low-Carbon Development Strategy: Transforming Guyana’s 
Economy while Combating Climate Change (Office of the President, Republic of Guyana 2010) 37. 
9 Based on 2018 data, when the GDP of Guyana was USD 3,610,435,299 – The World Bank, ‘Data’ (2019) 
<http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/themes/economy.html> accessed 16 July 2019. 
10 Paris Agreement (Paris, 12 December 2015; in force 4 November 2016). 
11 ExxonMobil, ‘ExxonMobil Increases Stabroek Resource Estimate to 5 Billion Barrels; Makes 10th Discovery’ 
(ExxonMobil, 3 December 2018) <https://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-increases-stabroek-
resource-estimate-5-billion-barrels-makes-10th-discovery> accessed 8 August 2019. 
12 Eg Guyana Chronicle. ‘How Will Guyana Benefit from Oil Revenue?’ Guyana Chronicle (8 August 2018) 
<http://guyanachronicle.com/2018/08/08/how-will-guyana-benefit-from-oil-revenue> accessed 16 July 2019; 
Robin Mills, ‘Guyana May be the Next Big Beast in Global Oil’ The National (8 October 2018) 
<www.thenational.ae/business/energy/guyana-may-be-the-next-big-beast-in-global-oil-1.778295> accessed 16 
July 2019; The Commonwealth, ‘Oil Set to Help Guyana Boost Economy and Benefit its Citizens’ (The 
Commonwealth, 25 January 2018) <http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/oil-set-help-guyana-boost-
economy-and-benefit-its-citizens> accessed 16 July 2019; Jennapher Lunde Seefeldt, ‘Guyana Hopes Oil Will 
Bring Wealth – Not Corruption and Crisis’ The Conversation (21 February 2019) 
<https://theconversation.com/guyana-hopes-oil-will-bring-wealth-not-corruption-and-crisis-108958> accessed 
16 July 2019. 
13 Richa Sekhani, ‘Poverty Facts: Almost 4 in 10 Guyanese Cannot Afford Basic Costs of Living’ (Guyana 
Budget & Policy Institute, August 2017) <https://gbpi.institute/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/FS_Poverty_20.8.2017.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019; Andrew Bauer, David Mihalyi 
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discoveries are worrying as the production and consumption of oil contribute to greenhouse 
gas emissions. 14  There are consequent concerns that offshore drilling would transform 
Guyana from a carbon sink (ie absorbs more carbon than it releases as carbon dioxide) to a 
net source of carbon dioxide emissions.15 Furthermore, ‘Guyana’s own history also suggests 
that the oil economy is likely to do more harm than good’.16 Mobilising financial resources 
for climate action whilst also encouraging oil exploration and production, which contribute to 
climate change, are therefore conflicting aims. This article explores the possible tensions, and 
possible synergies, that exist between laws and policies supporting the financing of these 
aims. This exploration is facilitated by the Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance 
Options. The purpose of this article is therefore two-fold; this article (1) explores climate 
finance in Guyana, and (2) tests the usefulness of the Framework as an analytical method to 
investigate climate finance.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section first describes the key 
terms used in this article and the method of scoping review adopted, as facilitated by the 
Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options. Section 3 then reviews climate 
finance options in Guyana. The penultimate section, Section 4, reviews finance options for 
oil exploration and production, and identifies possible synergies and tension with Guyanese 
climate finance options. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Research Design 
This article explores the current position of climate finance law in Guyana as enabling the 
financing of climate mitigation and adaptation actions, and identifies synergies and tensions 
that may exist with laws and policies for the financing of oil exploration and production. This 
research aim is realised through a desk-based scoping review facilitated by the Legal 
Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options. Before the approach and framework are 
detailed, this section first briefly discusses the key terms adopted in this research: ‘climate 
finance’ and ‘climate finance law’. 
2.1. Climate Finance and Climate Finance Law 
There is no single agreed definition of climate finance, with international agreements such as 
the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement also not defining the term but only referencing the need 
to mobilise it from ‘a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels’. 17  In general, 
definitions of climate finance cover at least one of the components of: its purpose (eg to 
support low-carbon projects), source (eg public or private sector), and direction of financial 
flows (eg developed to developing). For example, Venugopal and Patel state that climate 
finance in its broadest interpretation ‘refers to the flow of funds toward activities that reduce 
 
and Fernando Patzy, Discussion of Guyana’s Green Paper on “Managing Future Petroleum Revenues and 
Establishment of a Fiscal Rule and Sovereign Wealth Fund (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2018) 2. 
14 Eg Simon Dietz and others, Carbon Performance Assessment in Oil and Gas: Discussion Paper (Transition 
Pathway Initiative 2018). 
15  Bretton Woods Project, ‘World Bank DPL Paves Way for Offshore Drilling in Guyana, Despite CSO 
Concerns’ (Bretton Woods Project, 24 July 2018) <www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/07/world-bank-dpl-
paves-way-offshore-drilling-guyana-despite-cso-concerns> accessed 1 August 2019. 
16 Collin Constantine and Tarron Khemraj, ‘Geography, Economic Structures and Institutions: A Synthesis’ 
(2019, in press) Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 1, 5. 
17 Paris Agreement., art 9(3). 
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greenhouse gas emissions or help society adapt to climate change’s impacts’, 18  thereby 
addressing its purpose; Stadelman and others define climate finance as ‘financial flows 
mobilized by industrialized country governments and private entities that support climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries’,19 covering the purpose, source, 
and direction; and Zahar distinguishes between finance raised by states pursuant to their 
international UNFCCC obligations and finance raised through the deployment and leveraging 
of state finance,20 thereby focusing on sources of finance. 
The lack of a concrete agreed definition of ‘climate finance’ can be problematic because it 
can affect reporting, tracking, and monitoring practices; the differences in definitions result in 
different perceptions as to what entities, activities, and financial flows are considered, which 
can, in turn, affect the consistency of data between sources.21 The lack of consistent data can 
have a knock-on effect on effectiveness, as it can limit to what extent the data can be used to 
clearly identify where financial interventions can best impact the scaling up of climate 
finance.22 This article does not seek to resolve these issues, as they are beyond and do not 
impact the purpose of this scoping review. In this article a very broad definition of climate 
finance is adopted: public and private financing for climate adaptation and mitigation 
projects, both raised within country but also financial flows from other countries (whether 
developed to developing or developing to developing countries). 
The particular focus is on ‘climate finance law’. Climate finance law is an emerging field 
with ‘very poorly developed literature’ 23  – only Zahar, Bowman and Steenmans have 
explicitly used and discussed the term in published academic literature. 24  Zahar defines 
climate finance law as ‘the existence of state obligations on climate finance, whose 
imposition on Annex II parties at the outset of the UNFCCC regime (through article 4.3 of 
the Convention) is not really in doubt’25. 
That is, he relies on a ‘teleological analysis of the treaty law elaborated by the [UNFCCC] 
regime’.26 Bowman and Steenmans instead adopt a much broader definition: ‘the matrix of 
laws and regulation, both domestic and international, that mobilise and leverage finance and 
investment for climate mitigation and adaptation’. 27  The latter definition is adopted for 
similar reasons provided by Bowman and Steenmans: ‘This broad definition is seen as most  
18 S Venugopal and S Patel, ‘Why is Climate Finance so Hard to Define’ (World Resources Institute, 8 April 
2013) <www.wri.org/blog/2013/04/why-climate-finance-so-hard-define> accessed 8 August 2019. 
19 M Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa and J Timmons Roberts, 'Difficulties in Accounting for Private Finance in 
International Climate Policy' (2013) 13(6) Climate Policy 718, 720. 
20 Alexander Zahar, Climate Change Finance and International Law (Routledge 2017) 23. 
21 Stadelmann, Michaelowa and Roberts (n 19) 720; Adaptation Watch, 'Toward Climate Finance Reporting 
Systems in Latin America' (29 September 2017) <www.adaptationwatch.org/#our-publications> accessed 8 
August 2019; JT Roberts and R Weikmans, ‘Postface: Fragmentation, Failing Trust and Enduring Tensions over 
what Counts as Climate Finance’ (2017) 17(1) International Environmental Agreements 129, 133. 
22 A Falconer and M Stadelman, What is Climate Finance? Definitions to Improve Tracking and Scale Up 
Climate Finance (M Climate Policy Initiative Brief, July 2014) 3. 
23 Zahar (n 20) 51. 
24 Alexander Zahar, ‘The Paris Agreement and the Gradual Development of a Law on Climate Finance’ (2016) 
6 Climate Law 75; Zahar (n 20); Megan Bowman, Legal Readiness for Public-Private Climate Finance: An 
Options Paper for UN Environment (UN Environment, 6 February 2018); Megan Bowman and Katrien 
Steenmans, Climate Finance Law: Legal Readiness for Climate Finance (UN Environment and King’s College 
London 2018); Megan Bowman and Katrien Steenmans, Legal Readiness for Climate Finance: Private Sector 
Opportunities (UN Environment and King’s College London 2019). 
25 Zahar, ‘The Paris Agreement and the Gradual Development of a Law on Climate Finance’ (n 24) 75-76. 
26 Zahar, Climate Change Finance and International Law (n 20) 2. 
27 Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24) 7. 
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true to how law and regulation for climate finance is manifesting in practice and it embraces 
legal and financial plurality’.28 The broader definition also reflects literature that examines 
the legal perspectives and strategies of climate finance, which generally focuses on particular 
legal mechanisms and tools,29 while also incorporating the UNFCCC regime’s approach to 
climate finance in that it needs to come from different sources from the public, private, and in 
third sectors. 30  Moreover, similar logic applies as the argument for climate change law 
covering mitigation and adaptation, as well as all levels from sub-national to international 
level,31 instead of limiting it to ‘the legal obligations that states have taken upon themselves 
under the climate change regime’.32 Importantly, climate finance law is not presented as a 
self-contained regime or a discrete body of law, but instead it is part of climate change law 
and international environmental law.33 
2.2. Scoping Review 
Scoping reviews ‘aim to map rapidly the key concepts underpinning a research area and the 
main sources and types of evidence available’, 34  with mapping ‘a review that seeks to 
identify, not results, but linkages’.35 Daudt and others emphasise that, rather than speed, the 
purpose of scoping reviews should be to map ‘thoroughly and thoughtfully’,36 which is the 
approach adopted in this article. They are particularly relevant to emerging fields,37 which 
climate finance law is,38 and in which it is unclear what specific questions may be valuably 
investigated through a more precise and focused systematic review.39 Their ultimate aim is to 
 
28 ibid. 
29  Eg Richard B Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, and Bryce Rudyk (eds), Climate Finance: Regulatory and 
Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development (New York University Press 2009); Joseph E 
Aldy and Robert N Stavins, 'Using the Market to Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory and 
Experience' (2012) 141(2) Daedalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 45; María V 
Román, Alberto Ansuategi and Anil Markandya, ‘Climate Finance and International Negotiations on Climate 
Policy’ in Anil Markandya, Ibon Galarraga and Dirk Rübbelke, Climate Finance: Theory and Practice (World 
Scientific 2017). 
30 Eg UN Decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, art 1(e); Paris Agreement, art 
9. 
31 Eg Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (OUP 2017) 
10-11. 
32 Zahar, Climate Change Finance and International Law (n 20) 51. 
33 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani make this argument about climate change law – see Bodansky, Brunnée 
and Rajamani (n 31) 11 – and refer to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell’s argument that international environmental 
law is part of public international law – see Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International 
Law and the Environmnet (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 2-4. 
34 Nicholas Mays, Emilie Roberts and Jennie Popay, ‘Synthesising Research Evidence’ in Naomi Fulop and 
others (eds), Studying the Organisation and Delivery of Health Services: Research Methods (Routledge 2001) 
194 (emphasis in original). See also: Zachary Munn and others, ‘Systematic Review or Scoping Review? 
Guidance for Authors when Choosing Between a Systematic or Scoping Review Approach’ (2018) 18(143) 
BMC Medical Research Methodology 1, 2. 
35 I Diane Cooper, ‘What is a “mapping study?”’ (2016) 104(1) Journal of the Medical Library Association 76, 
76. 
36 Helena M L Daudt, Catherine van Mossel and Samantha J Scott, ‘Enhancing the Scoping Study Methodology: 
A Large, Inter-professional Team’s Experience with Arksey and O’Malley’s Framework’ (2013) 13 BMC 
Medical Research Methodology 48, 56. 
37 Mays, Roberts and Popay (n 34) 194; Danielle Levac, Heather Colquhoun and Kelly O’Brien, ‘Scoping 
Studies: Advancing the Methodology’ (2010) 5 Implementation Science 69, 69. 
38 Section 2.1. 
39 Mays, Roberts and Popay (n 34) 194; Hilary Arksey and Lisa O’Malley, ‘Scoping Studies: Towards a 
Methodological Framework’ (2005) 8(1) International Journal of Social Research Methodology 19, 20. 
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inform research agendas, and policy makers and researchers in asking the ‘right’ questions.40 
The purpose of this particular scoping review is to explore climate finance law in Guyana, 
and identify potential synergies and tensions with oil exploration and production finance 
mechanisms, with recommendations as to the specific questions on opportunities and gaps 
within this context that should be further explored both in research and in practice. 
There is no definitive methodology yet for scoping reviews. In this article, the 
methodological steps as articulated by Arksey and O’Malley 41  and advanced by Levac, 
Colquhoun and O’Brien 42  are used: (1) identify research question, (2) identify relevant 
studies, (3) study selection, (4) chart the data, and (5) collate, summarise, and report the 
results.43 Table 1 provides a more detailed overview of these stages. Importantly, the review 
is both structured and limited by the Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance 
Options, described in the next section; the presence or absence of climate finance options, as 
set out in the Framework, are reviewed within the Guyanese context and used as the structure 
to collate, summarise, and report results. 
  
  
 
40 Stuart Anderson and others, ‘Asking the Right Questions: Scoping Studies in the Commissioning of Research 
on the Organisation and Delivery of Health Services’ (2008) 6(7) Health Research Policy and Systems 7, 16; 
Heather L Colquhoun and others, ‘Scoping Reviews: Time for Clarity in Definition, Methods and Reporting’ 
(2014) 67 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 1291, 1292; Andrea C Tricco and others, ‘A Scoping Review on the 
Conduct and Reporting of Scoping Reviews’ (2016) 16(15) BMC Medical Research Methodology 1, 9; Munn 
and others (n 34) 2. 
41 Arksey and O’Malley (n 39) 22. 
42 Levac, Colquhoun and O’Brien (n 37). 
43 See Levac, Colquhoun and O’Brien (n 37) 72 and Colquhoun and others (n 40) 1293-1294 for the details of 
the enhanced methodological steps. The optional stage of consultation is not included. 
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Stage Arksey and 
O’Malley 
framework 
stage44 
Recommended 
clarification by Levac, 
Colquhoun and 
O’Brien45 
Overview of the stage for the purpose of 
this article 
1, Identify the 
research question 
Articulate the research 
question that will guide 
the enquiry 
Identify climate finance law landscape in 
Guyana, and possible synergies and 
tensions with oil exploration and 
production finance options 
Consider purpose of 
scoping study with the 
research question 
Map landscape of climate finance law 
options in Guyana and possible 
identification of tensions with finance 
mechanisms to support oil exploration and 
production 
Consider rationale for 
conducting scoping study 
Climate change is a critical issue, with 
Guyana particularly vulnerable. Significant 
financial resources are needed to adapt to 
and mitigate climate change. An overview 
of existing climate finance options can help 
identify opportunities and gaps. These need 
to be considered within the wider context 
of oil discoveries, which can be considered 
incompatible with climate mitigation 
actions 
2. Identify relevant 
studies 
Scope of study Academic and non-academic literature, 
including legislation, regulations, policy 
and strategic documents, news stories, and 
reports 
Limiting to options identified by Bowman 
in the Legal Analytical Framework of 
Climate Finance Options46 
Justify decisions and 
acknowledge potential 
limitations to study 
The review is not exhaustive as limited by 
the desk-based literature available. The 
application of the Framework also 
predominantly focuses on funding green 
activities rather than ‘greening’ brown 
activities 
3. Study selection Iterative process involving searching the literature, refining the search 
strategy, and reviewing articles for inclusion 
4. Chart data Develop data-charting 
form and determine 
variables to extract 
Populate Legal Analytical Framework of 
Climate Finance Options and identify their 
legal forms 
5. Collate, 
summarise, and 
report the results 
Analysis 
Reporting results and producing outcome 
Consider meaning of findings as they relate to the overall study purpose; 
discuss implications for future research, practice and policy 
 
44 Arksey and O’Malley (n 39). 
45 Levac, Colquhoun and O’Brien (n 37) 73. 
46 Section 2.3 
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Table 1. Overview of methodological stages for the scoping review. Steps (3) and (5) are not 
explained further because the steps articulated by Levac, Colquhoun and O’Brien are those adopted in 
this research.47 
2.3. Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options 
The Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options is adopted to provide the scope 
and data-charting form for the scoping review. Bowman developed the Framework in 2018 
based on extensive analysis of international climate finance law case studies,48 and it was 
then validated by Bowman and Steenmans through desk-based research and workshops by 
applying it within particular national contexts.49 In particular, workshop delegates – which 
included government and parliamentary officials, and participants from UN bodies, 
multilateral financial institutions, private consultancies, and academia – found the 
Framework to be very valuable and a useful ‘tool to help law and policy makers identify 
concrete actions to improve their enabling legal and regulatory environment for climate 
finance’.50 
The Framework identifies ‘a range of legal and regulatory options that can enable private 
finance and better leverage public finance at scale for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation’.51 These options are divided into two main categories of climate finance: hard 
‘financial mechanisms’, which directly mobilise or leverage finance – such as taxes, 
guarantees, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, or public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) – and ‘facilitative modalities’, which are ‘soft’ non-financial mechanisms that 
indirectly mobilise or leverage finance by enhancing project pipeline, capacity building, and 
knowledge transfer – such as emissions reporting or climate-related corporate disclosures.52 
Figure 1 sets out the Framework with different categories and examples of both financial 
mechanisms and facilitative modalities. Further detail on each of the options and how they 
may incentivise climate financing is discussed when they are reviewed within the Guyanese 
context in Section 3. 
 
47 ibid. 
48 Bowman (n 24) 5; Megan Bowman, ‘The Investment Plan for European and Climate Governance’ in Stephen 
Minas and Vassilis Ntousas (eds), EU Climate Diplomacy: Politics, Technology and Networks (Routledge 2018) 
103. 
49 Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24). 
50 ibid 21 (emphasis in original). 
51 ibid. 
52 Bowman (n 24) 10-11; Bowman, ‘The Investment Plan for European and Climate Governance’ (n 48) 103. 
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Figure 1. Legal Analytical Framework for Climate Finance. Based on Bowman53 and adapted from 
Bowman and Steenmans.54 
The presence or absence of each of the financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities is 
reviewed within the Guyanese context through a desk-based review of academic and non-
academic literature, including legislation, regulations, policy and strategic documents, news 
stories, and reports. No case law is discussed as this is one of the general limitations when 
reviewing Guyanese environmental laws; in Guyana, there is ‘very little by way of judicial 
pronouncement to show any trend in the development of legal norms through judicial 
precedent. The lack of reported cases exacerbates this problem’.55 When scoping the specific 
options, the assumption is not that all mechanisms and modalities need to be present 
simultaneously to ensure adequate climate financing – and neither in this article nor in the 
Framework is there an attempt to define what ‘adequate’ or ‘effective’ climate finance is – 
though a mix of both types of options are ‘essential and complementary for creating an 
enabling regulatory environment’.56 
The Framework recognises that the climate finance options may be implemented through 
different legal forms. The review therefore identifies the implementation mechanisms and  
53 Bowman (n 24). 
54 Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24) 15. 
55  Alicia Elias-Roberts, WWF-Guiana’s Project Report on Marine Biodiversity and Forest Governance: 
Legislative Review of the Environmental Laws of Guyana in Relation to the 2020 CBD Targets (WWF 2017) 
54. 
56 Bowman and Steenmans, Legal Readiness for Climate Finance (n 24) 6. 
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distinguishes between national legislation, regulation, policy and strategic documents, and 
contracts:57 
• National legislation covers acts by legislative bodies such as parliament or 
congress; 
• Regulations include subordinate regulations, executive orders, directives, and ‘soft 
law’ such as codes, guidances, and rules; 
• Contracts constitute agreements enforceable by law; and 
• Policy and strategic documents are issued by executive bodies to support 
implementation of climate finance options, including strategy and action plans. 
These documents are not always binding, but are included as they often reflect 
law and policy makers’ approach to the other legal forms. 
There are some limitations of using the Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance 
Options. The Framework focuses predominantly on ‘green finance’ and financing ‘green’ 
activities. For the purpose of describing this limitation of the Framework, ‘green’ is broadly 
understood as financial flows associated with zero- or low-carbon assets or activities. It is, 
however, noted that in wider scholarly literature and in practice there is no consensus on 
approaches to defining ‘green’,58 but this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. The 
Framework components of blended finance, tax credits and incentives, green bonds, feed-in 
tariffs, and all the facilitative modalities are mainly directed at incentivising and financing 
green activities, with only carbon pricing and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies specifically 
aimed at disincentivising ‘brown’ activities (ie activities contributing significantly to 
greenhouse gas emissions). There is, however, increasing focus in practice on ‘greening’ 
brown activities. For example, AXA Investment Managers consider there to be a ‘significant 
gap’ where investors can deliver ‘real impact’ for companies that are still financing brown 
projects, but have the ambition to transition to financing green environmentally-friendly 
projects in the future, by issuing transition bonds instead.59 There is scope in the Framework 
to consider these issues as part of both financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities. For 
example, the Hewlett Foundation has awarded grants to support proposals to transition 
towards sustainable retail banking, and, in addition to reporting on green climate financing, 
the tracking of brown finance (ie financial flows toward brown activities and technologies) 
can be really important in exposing the activities contributing to climate change.60 As the 
purpose of this article is as an initial scoping review, this limitation of the Framework is 
recognised, but the focus is on the general question of climate finance in Guyana and the  
57 Bowman (n 24) 69; Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24) 16. 
58 Eg G Inderst, C Kaminker and F Stewart, ‘Defining and Measuring Green Investments: Implications for 
Institutional Investors’ Asset Allocations’ (2012) OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private 
Pensions No. 24, 6; Walter Kahlenborn and others, Defining “Green” in the Context of Green Finance 
(European Union 2017) 1. 
59 Yo Takatsuki and Julien Foll, ‘Financing Brown to Green: Guidelines for Transition Bonds’ AXA Investment 
Managers (AXA Investment Managers, 10 June 2019) <https://realassets.axa-im.com/content/-
/asset_publisher/x7LvZDsY05WX/content/financing-brown-to-green-guidelines-for-transition-bonds/23818> 
accessed 18 July 2019. 
60 Hewlett Foundation, ‘Request for Proposal: Mobilizing Climate Change Mitigation Capital Through Retail 
Banking’ (Hewlett Foundation, 26 March 2018) <https://hewlett.org/request-proposal-mobilizing-climate-
change-mitigation-capital-retail-banking> accessed 27 July 2019; Chris Weber and others, Exploring Metrics to 
Measure the Climate Progress of Banks (World Resources Institute, UNEP Finance Initiative and 2 Degrees 
Investing Initiative 2018) 33. See also: Climate Transparency, Financing the Transition from Brown to Green: 
How to Track Country Performance Towards Low Carbon, Climate-resilient Economies (ODI and HVGP 2017) 
24. 
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particular question of the distribution between legal mechanisms enabling green finance and 
the greening of brown finance is recommended as an area for further research.61 
3. Climate Finance Options in Guyana 
There is evidence of both financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities implemented in 
Guyana. These are reviewed below. 
3.1. Financial Mechanisms 
Table 2 provides an overview of the financial mechanisms implemented in Guyana, which 
are detailed in subsequent subsections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 David Moher, Lesley Stewart and Paul Shekelle, ‘All in the Family: Systematic Reviews, Rapid Reviews, 
Scoping Reviews, Realist Reviews, and More’ (2015) 4 Systematic Reviews 1,1; Jessica Peterson and others, 
‘Understanding Scoping Reviews: Definition, Purpose, and Process’ (2017) 29 Journal of the American 
Association of Nurse Practitioners 12, 12-13. 
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Blended 
finance 
Green investment 
banks x 
No evidence that there is any intention 
to introduce one N/A 
Climate Trust 
Funds ✓ 
Environmental Trust Fund ✓     
REDD+ Investment Fund    ✓  
Guarantees & 
insurance x 
No evidence that any currently exist, 
though mechanisms such as 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency exist to facilitate in future 
N/A 
Grants & loans ✓ 
Norway and Guyana climate and forest 
partnership    ✓  
Grants from publicly and privately EU 
funded Caribbean Investment Facility     ✓  
PPPs & CDM ✓ 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
Policy Framework   ✓   
Guyana Skeldon Bagasse 
Cogeneration    ✓  
Carbon 
pricing 
Carbon & coal 
taxes x 
Has been previously proposed but 
never progressed N/A 
Emissions trading 
systems x No intention to implement N/A 
Tax credits 
& 
incentives 
Investment & 
production tax 
credits 
x No evidence that there is any intention to introduce one N/A 
Tax incentives for 
green activity ✓ 
Tax holidays for up to ten years for 
certain renewable energy activities 
creating employment 
✓     
Removal of import duty & tax barriers 
for renewable energy equipment & 
other technologies imports 
✓     
Green bonds x No evidence that there is any intention to introduce these N/A 
Feed-in tariffs x 
None currently exist, but there is a 
proposal to develop them in the draft 
National Energy Policy of Guyana 
N/A 
Remove fossil fuel subsidies x Fossil fuels continue to be subsidised N/A 
Table 2. Non-exhaustive overview of presence (✓) or absence (x) of financial mechanisms in Guyana. 
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3.1.1. Blended Finance 
Blended finance combines public and private finance, typically involving the use of public 
financial resources to increase private sector investment.62 It includes mechanisms such as 
green investment banks, climate trust funds, guarantees and insurance, grants and loans, and 
PPPs and CDM, which are all reviewed in turn within the Guyanese context below. 
In-country climate trust funds are often set up in developing countries as independent 
governance structures that meet high-level transparency and inclusiveness standards in order 
to receive funds through international finance and from domestic budgets and the private 
sector.63 Guyana has at least two examples of these: the Environmental Trust Fund and the 
Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF). 
The Environmental Protection Act 64  set up the Environmental Trust Fund. The Fund’s 
purpose includes: 
(a) protecting the environment and conserving natural resources; 
(b) incentive measures for reducing environmental pollution;  
(c) public awareness and education programmes to enhance the understanding of 
environmental protection and natural resources management issues within 
Guyana.65 
Although the above does not explicitly mention climate change, clearly climate action can 
protect the environment, reduce pollution, and requires public awareness and education.66 
Resources of the Fund can comprise private and public resources – section 60 of the Act 
provides that it includes Parliament-allocated sums; loan funds from the Environmental 
Protection Agency; sums provided by foreign states, international organisations, multilateral 
or bilateral lending agencies, private individuals, foundations, or corporations; revenue 
obtained as a result of the Act; and grants, subsidies, bequests, donations or gifts to the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
The GRIF was set up for the purpose of receiving funds as a result of a climate and forest 
partnership signed by Guyana and Norway in November 2009.67 The partnership was initially  
62 Eg Robyn Clark, James Reed and Terry Sunderland, ‘Bridging Funding Gaps for Climate and Sustainable 
Development: Pitfalls, Progress and Potential of Private Finance’ (2018) 71 Land Use Policy 335, 338; Naeeda 
C Morgado and Jens Sedemund, Blending Finance for Climate and Poverty (OECD 2018) 2. 
63 Alastair Marke and Bianca Sylvester, ‘Decoding the Current Global Climate Finance Architecture’ in Alastair 
Marke (ed), Transforming Climate Finance and Green Investment with Blockchains (Academic Press 2018) 39. 
64 Environmental Protection Act, Cap. 20:05 (Act 11 of 1996). 
65 ibid s 58. 
66 Eg Richard J Bord, Robert E O’Connor and Ann Fisher, ‘In What Sense does the Public Need to Understand 
Global Climate Change?’ (2000) 9(3) Public Understanding of Science 205; V Ramanathan and Y Feng, ‘Air 
Pollution, Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change: Global and Regional Perspectives’ (2009) 43(1) 
Atmospheric Environment 37; Susanne C Moser and Lisa Dilling, ‘Communicating Climate Change: Closing 
the Science-action Gap’ in John S Dryzek, Richard B Norgaard and David Schlosberg (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Climate Change and Society (OUP 2011). 
67 Government of Norway, ‘Guyana and Norway enter into Partnership to Protect Guyana’s Tropical Forests’ 
(Government of Guyana, 9 November 2009) <www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-
ii/md/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2009/guyana-and-norway-enter-into-
partnership/id584989/?id=584989> accessed 16 July 2019; Governments of Norway and Guyana, ‘Joint 
Concept Note on REDD+ Cooperation between Guyana and Norway’ (Government of Guyana, 2009) 
<www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/md/vedlegg/klima/klima_skogprosjektet/joint-concept-note-final-
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intended to last until the end of 2015, but is currently being continued based on annual 
approval by the Norwegian Minister of Climate and Environment. The partnership 
arrangement is unique because Norway pays Guyana for its avoided deforestation, based on 
independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation and forest degradation rates and progress 
on REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) enabling activities. 68  GRIF was set up 
through an Administrative Agreement between Norway and the World Bank’s International 
Development Association, the Trustee of the GRIF.69 The partnership highlights the overlaps 
that exist between financial mechanisms in the Legal Analytical Framework of Climate 
Finance Options as it is also an example of a grant from Norway to Guyana. 
Guarantees and insurance instruments are two of the most common types of risk underwriting 
tools. Guarantees are agreements or commitments that if a debtor borrows from a lender and 
agrees to repay the loan over a certain amount of time (with interest), then the guarantor 
commits to fulfil the terms of the original loan contract to the lender even if the debtor does 
not repay the loan on time and in full.70 Insurance policies are contracts issued by a third 
party agreeing to make a payment in the event of a particular event happening.71 They differ 
in that guarantees relate to non-performance in relation to a specific transaction whereas 
insurance provisions for a loss caused by unexpected events, and insurance is often more 
standardised whereas guarantees are tailored to individual characteristics of each 
transaction.72 Both in essence cover investors and lenders against perceived risks including 
the risks of expropriation, currency inconvertibility, war and civil disturbance, breach of 
contract, and failure to honour financial obligations. 73  Both guarantee, and insurance 
instruments can therefore make development projects more commercially viable by reducing 
the risk profile of the investment and overall capital costs; typically not requiring immediate 
disbursement of capital; and only requiring funding when called, which only happens in a 
portion of cases.74 
There is no evidence of guarantee and insurance instruments currently being used for climate 
change mitigation or adaptation projects in Guyana. Since 2015, the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an international financial institution which offers political risk 
insurance and credit risk enhancement guarantees for cross-border private sector investors 
and lenders, has made climate action one of its priority areas.75 In 2016, MIGA stated it  
version-13-november-2009.pdf?id=2301155> accessed 16 July 2019. See also: Frankfurt School – UNEP 
Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance, Case Study: Guyana REDD-plus Investment 
Fund (GRIF) (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 2012). 
68 Guyana Low Carbon Development Strategy, ‘Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF): Fact Sheet’ (2010) 
<www.lcds.gov.gy/index.php/documents/guyana-redd-investment-fund-grif> accessed 20 July 2019. 
69 Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance (n 67) 13 and 16 
70 Chris Humphrey and Annalisa Prizzon, Guarantees for Development: A Review of Multilateral Development 
Bank Operations (ODI 2014) 10. 
71 OECD, Blended Finance Vol. 1: A Primer for Development Finance and Philanthropic Funders (World 
Economic Forum 2015) 17. 
72 Humphrey and Prizzon (n 70) 10. 
73  African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, the Islamic 
Development Bank and the World Bank Group, 2018 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks’ Climate 
Finance (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2019) 22. 
74 OECD (n 71) 17. 
75 MIGA, ‘Our Impact: Climate Change’ (2019) <www.miga.org/climate-change> accessed 23 July 2019. 
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would ‘look to support productive investment projects through its political risk guarantees as 
relevant opportunities emerge’ in Guyana,76 but none have yet emerged.77 
There are examples of grants and loans for climate action in Guyana. Grants are funds that do 
not need to be repaid, whereas loans require repayment. Grants therefore often have stricter 
restrictions in relation to the use of funds in comparison to loans, though loans also have 
restrictions. Both can again be used to leverage private investment, for example, by 
combining grants with loans and equities from public and private sources, including bilateral 
and multilateral development banks. 78  For example, the European Union (EU) and its 
Member States have established the Caribbean Investment Facility, which is a blending 
facility that covers the Caribbean region, including Guyana, and combines grant funding 
from the European Development Fund with public and private resources, such as loans from 
EU and regional financial institutions.79 So far, two Guyanese projects have received support: 
(1) a programme aimed at strengthening the operational efficiency and corporate 
management capacity of Guyana Power and Light Inc (GPL), that will also help prepare GPL 
to develop and manage renewable energy projects,80 and (2) a programme that will finance 
the rehabilitation of part of the infrastructure of the water supply network and improved 
sanitation services. 81  Additionally, as previously mentioned, the climate and forest 
partnership that set up GRIF is also an example of a grant from Norway to Guyana. 
PPPs are a form of blended finance as a result of a long-term contract between a private party 
and public sector entity, in which usually a public sector entity provides remuneration to a 
private party for supplying a public asset or service while also bearing significant risk and 
management responsibility. 82  In 2018, the Government of Guyana published its Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) Policy Framework.83 The Framework is part of the Government’s 
programme to create appropriate policy, institutional, and legal frameworks for local and 
external private sector stakeholders to engage meaningfully with the Government to achieve 
economic development. It provides a structured platform and guiding principles, and 
encourages PPPs to be used to deliver new assets and services in priority infrastructure  
76 The World Bank Group, ‘International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, and 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Country Engagement Note for the Cooperative Republic of Guyana 
for the Period FY16-18’ (23 March 2016) Report No 94017-GY, 17 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/945941467999118138/pdf/94017-REVISED-Box394888B-OUO-
9-IDA-R2016-0055-2.pdf> accessed 23 July 2019. 
77  Only one project in Guyana has received two reinsurance contracts (against risks of currency transfer, 
expropriation, and war and civil disturbance) from MIGA: to construct and operate an open-pit gold mine to 
contribute to Guyana’s export earnings in 1991 (so no longer active). This was thus not a climate mitigation or 
adaptation project. MIGA, ‘Omai Gold Mines Ltd’ (2019) <www.miga.org/project/omai-gold-mines-ltd> 
accessed 23 July 2019. 
78  European Commission, ‘International Climate Finance’ (2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/finance_en> accessed 20 July 2019. 
79 European Commission, ‘Caribbean Investment Facility’ (2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/latin-
america/caribbean-investment-facility_en> accessed 20 July 2019. 
80  European Commission, ‘Power Utility Upgrade Programme’ (2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/blending/power-utility-upgrade-programme_en> accessed 20 July 2019. 
81  European Commission, ‘Water and Sanitation Infrastructure Improvement Program’ (2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/blending/water-and-sanitation-infrastructure-improvement-program_en> 
accessed 20 July 2019. 
82 OECD (n 71) 8; The World Bank, Public-Private Partnerships Reference Guide (The World Bank 2017) 1. 
See also: United Nations, Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development (United Nations 2015) para 48. 
83  Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Policy Framework (Cooperative 
Republic of Guyana 2018). 
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sectors, including renewable energy sectors and in particular hydro plants.84 The forms of 
PPPs covered by the Framework range from very low private sector participation (eg a 
contract to build an asset but the public sector still owns and operates the asset) to full 
divesture by the public sector to a licensed, regulated energy distribution company (eg where 
private sector owns and operates assets).85 
CDM is an international mechanism that enables PPPs.86 It is defined by Article 12 the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC;87 in brief, the CDM allows a country with an emission reduction or 
limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to benefit from emission-reduction projects 
in developing countries in order to earn saleable certified emission reduction credits, which 
can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets. CDM therefore does not represent the usual 
financial flows of PPPs of public entities remunerating private entities, but instead various 
sources of private and public capital can be raised for developing country private or public 
sector entities acting as project hosts.88 Currently, the future of the CDM is uncertain. In 
theory it could remain operational indefinitely, though there is already declining interest in 
the mechanism.89 Moreover, some Parties agree that it would be inefficient to have the CDM 
running indefinitely and in parallel with the Article 6.4 mechanism set out in the Paris 
Agreement.90 The experiences, both in terms of successes and failures, gained from CDM are 
nonetheless invaluable as it is likely to inspire and inform whatever similar tools are adopted 
under Paris Agreement.91 
There has only been one credited CDM project in Guyana: the Guyana Skeldon Bagasse 
Cogeneration Project between May 2008 and 2017.92 This project comprised adding a more 
efficient bagasse-powered co-generation plant to the Skeldon Sugar Modernization Project. 
Bagasse is a renewable fuel resource, that is a residue in the sugarcane process, and replaces 
 
84 ibid 6 and 12. 
85 ibid 9. 
86  Richard Stewart and others, The Clean Development Mechanism: Building International Public-Private 
Partnerships under the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 2000) UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/Misc.7, 1; Charlotte 
Streck, ‘New Partnerships in Global environmental Policy: The Clean Development Mechanism’ (2004) 13(3) 
Journal of Environment & Development 295, 313; Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, Climate Capitalism: 
Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 29. 
87 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997; 
in force 16 February 2005). 
88 Stewart and others (n 86) 55; Gudrun Benecke and others, ‘From Public-Private Partnership to Market: The 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a New Form of Governance in Climate Protection’ (2008) SFB-
Governance Working Paper No. 10, 13 <https://refubium.fu-
berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/19185/sfbgov_wp10_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 21 July 
2019. 
89  Climate Focus, ‘What is the Future of the CDM? Question and Answers’ (June 2017) 1 
<https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/Post-2020%20CDM%20QA%20Briefing%20Note.pdf> accessed 9 
August 2019. 
90 ibid. 
91 Anthony Mansell, ‘What’s Ahead for Carbon Markets after COP21?’ (2016) 10(1) BIORES 16, 18-19; Asian 
Development Bank, Decoding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (ADB 2018) 24; UNFCCC, ‘CDM Can Inspire, 
Inform, Outfit Any New Mechanism under Paris Agreement’ UN Climate Change News (3 May 2018) 
<https://unfccc.int/news/cdm-can-inspire-inform-outfit-any-new-mechanism-under-paris-agreement> accessed 
21 July 2019; Axel Michaelowa and Sonja Butzengeiger, Ensuring Additionality under Art. 6 of the Paris 
Agreement (Perspectives 2017) 5; Karen Holm Olsen, Christof Arens and Florian Mersmann, ‘Learning from 
CDM SD Tool Experience for Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement’ (2018) 18(4) Climate Policy 383, 384. 
92  UNFCCC, ‘Project 1458: Guyana Skeldon Bagasse Cogeneration Project’ (2019) 
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/SGS-UKL1196357091.25/view> accessed 12 May 2019. 
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light fuel oil in diesel engine-driven generators. The total project cost was USD 32.2 
million.93 Project participants included Spain, Denmark, and Italy.94 
Finally, there is no evidence that a green investment bank has been considered within the 
Guyanese context. The OECD defines green investment banks as 
a publicly capitalised entity established specifically to facilitate and attract private 
investment into domestic [low-carbon and climate-resilient] infrastructure and other 
green sectors such as water and waste management through different activities and 
interventions.95 
This highlights that their particular purpose is to incentivise climate financing. They can be 
established at national, state, county, and city levels.96 They have typically been established 
in developed countries, but there is increasing interest in creating them in developing 
countries,97 though Guyana has not yet publicly expressed or announced such an interest. 
3.1.2. Carbon Pricing 
According to the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
carbon pricing ‘should be a fundamental pillar of policies designed to mitigate climate 
change’, even though they are not always popular with businesses and consumers.98 A carbon 
price aims to encourage polluters to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they emit by 
applying a cost to carbon pollution. This can be through a carbon tax, applied explicitly (ie 
applied to greenhouse gas emissions) or implicitly (eg energy taxes or fuel taxes),99 or a cap-
and-trade system where emissions per country, region, or sector are capped. 
No mechanisms for pricing carbon have been implemented in Guyana; there is neither an 
emissions trading system nor a carbon or coal tax. There is currently no plan of developing an 
emissions trading system, as it is not expected that Guyana would financially benefit from 
carbon trade. The reasons provided include: (1) the Norway and Guyana climate and forest 
partnership pays for avoided deforestation; (2) private trading markets only pay for reduced 
emissions; and (3) Guyana is a unique country possessing high forest cover and a low 
deforestation rate.100 This is reiterated in Guyana’s (revised) NDC, which states that ‘Guyana 
 
93  CDM Executive Board, Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) 
Version 03 – in effect as of: 28 July 2006 (CDM Executive Board and UNFCCC 2006) 2 
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/V/S/S/VSSDFHR8560V4TR0RMYXNTUCO02LMO/Revised%20PDD%20
version%203.pdf?t=WDh8cHJkdm56fDD59fyxtUxmMC0VzyZNIwxG> accessed 12 May 2019.  
94 See UNFCCC (n 92) for a complete list of parties involved. 
95  OECD, Green Investment Banks: Scaling up Private Investment in Low-carbon, Climate-resilient 
Infrastructure (OECD 2016) 18. 
96 ibid 15. 
97 Bowman (n 24) 21. 
98 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, The Case for Carbon Pricing (LSE 
2011) 1. 
99 Barbara Buchner and others, ‘The Landscape of Climate Finance’ in Erik Haites (ed), International Climate 
Finance (Routledge 2013) 17. 
100 Stacy Carmichael, ‘Carbon Trading Not a Viable Option for Climate Financing’ (Department of Public 
Information, 3 August 2018) <https://dpi.gov.gy/carbon-trading-not-a-viable-option-for-climate-financing-gfc-
rep> accessed 10 May 2019; Newsroom, ‘Guyana Unlikely to Benefit from Carbon Trading’ Newsroom (3 
August 2018) <https://newsroom.gy/2018/08/03/guyana-unlikely-to-benefit-from-carbon-trading> accessed 12 
July 2019. 
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does not currently see viable opportunities in carbon trading markets; however this does not 
preclude participation in green consumer markets at all levels’.101 
In contrast, a carbon tax was reportedly advocated in 2009 by former President of Guyana, 
Bharrat Jagdeo,102 and considered again by the government in 2015 according to the Minister 
of Natural Resources, Raphael Trotman.103 This has, however, not progressed and Jagdeo has 
since expressed his opposition to a carbon tax, as it would be a cost barrier to doing 
business.104 
3.1.3. Tax Credits and Incentives 
Investment tax credits are one-off incentives that allow individuals or entities to claim a tax 
credit up to a specified percentage of their project’s capital costs. In the United States, for 
example, a federal income tax exists for certain types of renewable energy projects including 
solar, geothermal, and fuel cell energy. 105 Production tax credits are a form of financial 
support; they are an income tax credit for the production of energy. Again, the United States 
has introduced production tax credits for wind energy, and these have resulted in an increase 
in supply of wind power for the United States.106 There are currently no investment and 
production tax credits implemented in Guyana in relation to renewable energy, and there is 
also no evidence of a plan to implement such incentives. 
Possible tax incentives for green activity do exist in Guyana in the form of tax holidays that 
can be granted for a period of up to ten years.107 Tax holidays, which provide an exemption 
from corporation tax, can be granted for activities creating new employment in the field of 
‘infrastructural development, including the production of electricity using renewable sources 
of energy’.108 Additionally, though not strictly a tax incentive, some of the potential tax 
barriers to green activities have been removed; there has been the removal of import duty and 
tax barriers for renewable energy equipment and other technologies imports in Customs 
(Amendment) Act109 and Value-Added Tax Act.110  
101 Government of Guyana, ‘Guyana’s Revised Intended Nationally Determined Contribution’ (20 May 2016) 6 
<www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Guyana%20First/Guyana's%20revised%20NDC%20-
%20Final.pdf> accessed 12 July 2019. 
102 Guyana Chronicle. ‘CARICOM moves on Guyana’s Carbon Tax Proposal’ Guyana Chronicle (16 June 
2009) <http://guyanachronicle.com/2009/06/16/caricom-moves-on-guyanas-carbon-tax-proposal> accessed 12 
July 2019. 
103 Kaieteur News, ‘Any Tax Similar to a Carbon Tax Does Not Make Sense – Opposition Leader’ Kaieteur 
News (14 November 2015) <www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2015/11/14/any-tax-similar-to-a-carbon-tax-does-
not-make-sense-opposition-leader> accessed 19 July 2019; Kaieteur News, ‘Carbon Tax can Cripple Local 
Producers – Opposition Leader’ Kaieteur News (1 December 2015) 
<www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2015/12/01/carbon-tax-can-cripple-local-producers-opposition-leader> 
accessed 19 July 2019. 
104 ibid. 
105 26 U.S. Code Title 26 – Internal Revenue Code, §48. 
106 Eg Merrill Jones Barradale, ‘Impact of Public Policy Uncertainty on Renewable Energy Investment: Wind 
Power and the Production Tax Credit’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 7098; Xi Lu and others, ‘The Impact of 
Production Tax Credits on the Profitable Production of Electricity from Wind in the U.S.’ (2011) 39 Energy 
Policy4207; Travis Roach, ‘The Effect of the Production Tax Credit on Wind Energy Production in Deregulated 
Electricity Markets’ (2015) 127 Economics Letters 86 
107 Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Act, Cap. 81:02 (Act 16 of 1951), s 2(1A). 
108 ibid, s 2(1)(b)(x). 
109 Customs (Amendment) Act, Cap. 82:01 (Act 2 of 2017). 
110 Value-Added Tax Act, Cap. 81:05 (Act 10 of 2005). 
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The government in its draft National Energy Policy of Guyana – Green Paper,111 which will 
update the 1994 National Energy Policy of Guyana,112 intends to introduce tax incentives 
aimed at residential customers, commercial entities, and developers to encourage the wide 
spread deployment of small, medium, and large scale renewable energy technologies, such as 
tax rebates that reduce the taxable income of purchasers by the costs of the technology.113 No 
timelines are indicated for the implementation of such tax incentives, and there is no evidence 
that discussions on possible incentives have developed further. 
3.1.4. Green Bonds 
Green bonds are ‘debt instruments used to finance green projects that deliver environmental 
benefits’, 114  where green often refers to environmentally-friendly projects such as 
renewables, water and energy efficiency, bioenergy, and low carbon transports.115 There is 
currently no liquid domestic bond market in Guyana (though a return has been considered)116 
and no evidence that green bonds have been considered within the Guyanese context. This 
reflects the situation in many developing countries, as the green bond ‘market remains 
incipient, and its full potential seems to be underappreciated’,117 though there is an increasing 
demand.118 There are still a number of barriers to the developing a green bond market in 
developing countries such as Guyana: institutional barriers (including lack of technical skills 
required to ensure that projects are implemented in accordance with the Green Bond 
Principles, the globally most widely accepted standards; lack of knowledge of existing 
international practices in green bond transactions; and inappropriate institutional 
arrangements in some developing countries) and market barriers (issue of minimum size, 
currency of issuance, high transaction costs associated with green bond issuance).119 
3.1.5. Feed-in Tariffs 
Feed-in tariffs are mechanisms designed to promote the rapid development and uptake of 
renewable energy sources; they are in essence guaranteed payments to energy producers for 
the renewable electricity they generate.120 The government in its draft National Energy Policy 
of Guyana intends to develop a fixed price feed-in tariff regime with anticipated maximum  
111  Roland Clarke, ‘Draft National Energy Policy of Guyana – Report 2 – Green Paper’ (2017) 
<www.electricity.gov.gy/HECI_Docs/Report2_GY_EnergyPolicy_Feb20_17.pdf> accessed 20 July 2019. 
112 The National Energy Policy committee, Energy Policy of Guyana (Government of Guyana 1994). 
113 Clarke (n 111) 16. 
114 OECD and others, Green Bonds: Country Experiences, Barriers and Options (G20 GFSG 2016) 4. See also: 
Climate Bonds Initiative and UNEP Inquiry, Scaling up Green Bond Markets for Sustainable Development 
(Climate Bonds Initiative and UNEP Inquiry 2015); OECD, Green Finance and Investment: Mobilising Bond 
Markets for a Low-Carbon Transition (OECD 2017). 
115 Emanuele Campiglio, ‘Beyond Carbon Pricing: The Role of Banking and Monetary Policy in Financing the 
Transition to a Low-carbon Economy’ (2016) 121 Ecological Economics 220, 220; Josué Banga, ‘The Green 
Bond Market: A Potential Source of Climate Finance for Developing Countries’ (2019) 9(1) Journal of 
Sustainable Finance & Investment 17, 18. See also text to n 58. 
116 Lucien Chauvin, ‘Guyana Poised to Return to Bond Market after Two Decade Gap’ (GlobalCapital, 11 
October 2015) <www.globalcapital.com/article/yvxxmx2y5mcx/guyana-poised-to-return-to-bond-market-after-
two-decade-gap> accessed 23 July 2019; IMF, Guyana: Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation – 
Debt Sustainability Analysis (IMF 2018) 5. 
117 Banga (n 115) 19. 
118 Olaf Weber and Vasundhara Saravade, Green Bonds: Current Development and Their Future (Centre for 
International Governance Innovation 2019) 8. 
119 Banga (n 115) 24-27. 
120 Eg Toby Couture and Yves Gagnon, ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models: Implications for 
Renewable Energy Investment’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 955, 955. 
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time limits between 10 and 20 years to ‘enhance the bankability of the renewable energy 
projects and to provide for a reasonable return to householders and investors’.121 No timeline 
is stipulated in the draft.122 
3.1.6. Removal of Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Fossil fuels continue to be subsidised in Guyana.123 It is unlikely that this will change soon as 
the Minister of Finance in Guyana asserted in January 2019 that fossil fuel subsidies are not 
the enemy of the green economy: ‘From a developing country aspect, it is not easy to remove 
subsidies that are targeting the poor in developing countries’.124 
3.2. Facilitative Modalities 
Table 3 provides an overview of the facilitative modalities implemented in Guyana, which 
are detailed in subsequent subsections.    
 
121 Clarke (n 111) 28. 
122 ibid. 
123 Section 4.1.3. 
124 Carin Smith, ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidies are the Enemy of the Green Economy – Minister’ fin24 (16 January 
2019) <www.fin24.com/Economy/fossil-fuel-subsidies-are-the-enemy-of-the-green-economy-minister-
20190116-2> accessed 20 July 2019. 
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Knowledge 
sharing & 
capacity 
building 
Centralised 
information services x 
None currently exist, but there is an 
intention to develop permanent 
capacity for providing information 
to end-users in Climate Resilience 
Strategy and Action Plan (CRSAP) 
N/A 
(if developed as 
part of CRSAP 
then a policy & 
strategic doc) 
Matchmaking & 
training schemes ✓ 
‘Climate finance for agriculture in 
Guyana’ workshop     ✓ 
‘Capacity Building of the National 
Designated Authority (NDA) and 
Preparation of the Country 
Strategic Framework of the 
Cooperative Republic of Guyana’ 
programme 
    ✓ 
Idea Labs x No evidence N/A 
Corporate 
conduct 
General GHG 
emissions reporting x No evidence N/A 
Climate-related 
corporate disclosures x No evidence N/A 
Prudential regulation & banks x No evidence N/A 
Renewable energy targets & 
renewable portfolio standards  ✓ 
100% reliant on renewable energy 
by 2025 set out in its NDC, though 
this target is expected to be revised 
  ✓   
Measurement 
& metrics 
Tracking finance 
flows in-country ✓* 
No central mechanism but this is 
required for some financial 
mechanisms 
Legal form 
depends on the 
particular 
mechanism 
Outcomes & impacts 
of financial 
mechanisms 
✓* 
No central mechanism but this is 
required for some financial 
mechanisms (legal form depends on 
the particular mechanism) 
N/A 
Table 3. Non-exhaustive overview of facilitative modalities in Guyana: present (✓), absent (x), 
present in certain circumstances (✓*). 
3.2.1. Knowledge Sharing and Capacity Building 
The Government of Guyana recognises that knowledge sharing and capacity building is 
required: 
[Guyana] needs to further develop capacity that will allow for the design and 
implementation of effective policy frameworks across sectors that will support efforts 
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to exploit the country’s mitigation potential through both public and private sector 
projects. This includes development and capacity building for institutions, and 
fostering the capacity and knowledge of private sector actors, including financial 
intermediaries.125 
Suggestions by the Government to support capacity building include formulating a capacity-
building action plan that will include activities to promote awareness raising, data collection 
and management, and dissemination of information.126 This has not yet been formulated.  
Further information is required for better decision-making,127 including on climate finance. 
Relevant and suitable information can, for example, enhance effectiveness of climate finance 
and establish a more reliable framework to measure, report, and verify climate finance flows, 
which in turn is critical for improving transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of 
international action.128 Though once centralised information is available, there are questions 
in relation to the disconnect that persists between information and decision-making.129 
The current informational capacity in Guyana has been described as ‘sporadic in nature’,130 
with the Government of Guyana identifying the need to upgrade its limited human 
informational capacity in its draft Climate Resilience Strategy and Action Plan (CRSAP).131 
The CRSAP aims to provide a roadmap for the next five years, identifies four priority climate 
resilience programmes for which funding proposals can be developed and submitted, 
summarises the most significant climate risks and required resilience actions across 15 key 
sectors, identifies a set of capacity building actions, and formulates a strategy to finance the 
CRSAP.132 In the CRSAP, it is recognised that there is a need to develop permanent capacity 
for generating, collating, and disseminating climate projections and a comprehensive suite of 
vulnerability, risk, and adaptation assessments for providing information to end-users. 133 
Currently the main centralised information service is the Hydrometeorological Service in 
Guyana, which observes, archives, and understands Guyana’s weather and climate,134 but 
there is none in relation to climate finance, such as a register of climate vulnerabilities and 
risks facing the public and private sector that may affect budgeting and investment strategies.  
125 Government of Guyana, Guyana: Second National Communication to the UNFCCC (Government of Guyana 
2012) 147 (emphasis added). 
126 ibid. 
127 Daniel Sarewitz and Roger A Pielke Jr, ‘The Neglected Heart of Science Policy: Reconciling Supply of and 
Demand for Science’ (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 5, 6; John Tribbia and Susanne C Moser, 
‘More than Information: What Coastal Managers Need to Plan for Climate Change’ (2008) 11 Environmental 
Science & Policy 315, 317. 
128 Barbara Buchner, Jessica Brown, and Jan Corfee-Morlot, ‘Monitoring and Tracking Long-term Finance to 
Support Climate Action’ (2011) Climate Change Expert Group Paper No. 2011(3), 12-13 <www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/5k44zcqbbj42-
en.pdf?expires=1565009045&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=8DECA013C7D37D7E3AA7C1609876732D
> accessed 5 August 2019; Barbara Buchner and others, The Landscape of Climate Finance: A CPI Report 
(Climate Policy Initiative 2011) 52. 
129 Tribbia and Moser (n 127) 316. 
130  UNDP, National Adaptation Plan Guyana: Japan-Caribbean Climate Change Partnership (J-CCCP) 
Inception Report (UNDP 2017) 19. 
131 Government of Guyana, Climate Resilience Strategy and Action Plan for Guyana – Draft for Consultation 
(Government of Guyana 2015) 13. 
132 ibid 1-2. 
133 ibid 13-14. 
134  Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Hydrometeorological’ (2019) <https://agriculture.gov.gy/hydrometeorological> 
accessed 5 August 2019. 
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There is some evidence of sector-specific initiatives for matchmaking and training, which can 
be considered as a form of structured dialogue that brings together representatives of different 
groups of stakeholders, such as civil society, and the public and private sectors. 135  The 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre has recently implemented a new programme: 
Capacity Building of the National Designated Authority (NDA) and Preparation of the 
Country Strategic Framework of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. The purpose of this 
programme is to build and strengthen institutional capacity to engage with the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF). The GCF is a financial mechanism established within the framework of the 
UNFCCC that helps fund climate finance investment in low-emission, climate-resilient 
development in developing countries. In particular, the programme helps businesses, NGOs 
and government agencies apply for funding from the GCF.136 
Another initiative where training and engaging various stakeholders was the focus is the 
workshop on ‘Climate finance for agriculture in Guyana’ convened by the Office of Climate 
Change of the Ministry of the Presidency of Guyana in partnership with the Technical Centre 
for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation in July 2019.137 The purpose of this workshop was to 
engage different stakeholders, including officials from the Ministries of Environment, 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Finance and Economic Planning, as well as 
representatives from farmers’ organisations, the commercial banking sector, agro-allied 
businesses, NGOs, and development organisations to discuss and identify key options to 
promote climate finance for agriculture in general and climate smart agriculture in particular 
in Guyana.138 
Neither the programme nor workshop were the result of a particular legal form, but were 
initiatives and coalitions by other organisations. These are therefore not examples of climate 
finance law in themselves, but instead can contribute to the development of an enabling 
environment for creating climate finance law. 
Idea labs are collaborative schemes made to generate new ideas for mobilising climate 
finance.139 There are no examples of such labs existing in Guyana. Arguably the workshop 
on ‘Climate finance for agriculture in Guyana’ had elements of an idea lab, as part of the 
purpose was to discuss options for promoting climate finance, though it would not be wholly 
considered an idea lab as idea labs aim to develop innovative financial instruments. The 
Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance is a global public-private sector initiative that 
identifies, designs, and pilots innovative climate finance instruments to unlock private 
 
135 Bowman (n 24) 43; Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24) 18-19. 
136  Green Climate Fund, ‘Readiness Proposal with FAO for Republic of Guyana’ (31 July 2017) 
<www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/466992/Readiness_proposals_-
_Guyana___FAO___Entity_Support_and_Strategic_Frameworks.pdf/675801d3-0984-fe17-d089-
c7cf23f373f8> accessed 16 July 2019; Acclimatise News, ‘Can the Green Climate Fund Help Guyana Respond 
to Climate Change’ (Acclimatise, 3 August 2018) 1-2 <www.acclimatise.uk.com/2018/08/03/can-the-green-
climate-fund-help-guyana-respond-to-climate-change> accessed 16 July 2019.. 
137  Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, ‘National Workshop: Climate Finance for 
Agriculture in Guyana’ (2019) <www.cta.int/en/event/national-workshop-climate-finance-for-agriculture-in-
guyana-sid03056d52e-f818-426c-9b97-6c0c763db10b> accessed 16 July 2019. 
138 Information on the outcomes of this workshop is not yet available online at the time of submitting this article. 
139 Bowman (n 24) 44. 
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investment at scale.140 There is no evidence of any specific engagement by the Lab with 
stakeholders in Guyana. 
3.2.2. Corporate Conduct 
Guyana as a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC is required to submit a national 
communication every four years (though its most recent submission was in 2012),141 which 
includes a national inventory of all greenhouse gas sources and sinks.142 This inventory did 
not cover the corporate sector specifically (or even mention it) – the sectors reported on are 
the energy, industrial, agriculture, land use change and forestry, and waste sectors.143 
Globally, there are an increasing number of companies measuring greenhouse gas emissions 
generated by their activities and assessing their exposure to climate change.144 The OECD in 
its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises encourages disclosure or communication 
practices on greenhouse gas emissions,145 as such reporting is invaluable in enabling the 
reporting entity to make informed and robust decisions about climate action and finance 
required. Different initiatives exist globally, such as the Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 
which is an international consortium of business and environmental NGOs, as well as some 
countries are implementing programmes or legislation on climate-related corporate 
disclosures. For example, Article 173 of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Law in 
France requires investors to report on how environmental, social, and governance criteria, 
with climate specifically mentioned, are integrated into their decision-making.146 There is no 
evidence in Guyana yet of such requirements on corporate conduct.147 
3.2.3. Prudential Regulation and Banks 
Key stakeholders in the banking sector, such as Yves Mersch, who is a Member of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank, acknowledge that national legislation and 
bank regulations do not adequately address climate risk and opportunity.148 This also applies  
140 The Lab, ‘Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance’ (2019) <www.climatefinancelab.org/the-labs/global> 
accessed 5 August 2019. 
141  Guyana’s most recent submission: Government of Guyana (n 125). Its submissions are available on: 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-
convention/national-communications-and-biennial-update-reports-non-annex-i-parties/national-communication-
submissions-from-non-annex-i-parties. 
142 UN Decision 17/CP.8, art 1 (see also UNFCCC, art 12). 
143 Government of Guyana (n 125) 59-94. 
144 Céline Kauffmann, Cristina Tébar Less and Dorothee Teichmann, ‘Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reporting: A Stocktaking of Government Schemes’ (2012) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 
11 <www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_1.pdf> accessed 5 August 2019. 
145 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011) 29. 
146 Loi n 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énérgetique pour la croissance verte (French Energy 
Transition Law for Green Growth), art 173. See Kauffmann, Less and Teichmann (n 144) for further examples. 
147  Legislative and regulatory instruments reviewed: Financial Institutions, Cap. 75:01 (Act 1 of 1995); 
Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act (Act 9 of 199); Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act (Act 22 of 
2004); Financial Institutions Act (Act 12 of 2015); Financial Institutions Regulations 1996 (4 of 1996); Bank of 
Guyana Act, Cap. 85:02 (Act 19 of 1998); Bank of Guyana (Amendment) Act (Act 21 of 2004); Bank of 
Guyana (Amendment) Act (Act 14 of 2018); Bank of Guyana, ‘Supervision Guideline No. 8 on Corporate 
governance’ and ‘Supervision Guideline No. 9 on Risk Management’ (1996) 
<www.bankofguyana.org.gy/bog/legal-regulatory-framework/supervision-guidelines> accessed 12 August 
2019. 
148 Eg Environmental Audit Commons Select Committee, ‘Greening Finance: Embedding Sustainability in 
Financial Decision Making’ (UK Parliament, 6 June 2018) 
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within the Guyanese context – there is neither evidence of prudential regulation on climate 
change risks and opportunities being implemented by banks nor being required by national 
legislation – as well as at international level. Basel III is an internationally agreed set of 
measures aimed at strengthening the regulation, supervision, and risk management of 
banks.149 In 2014, UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the University of Cambridge 
Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) undertook a research project on Basel III and 
environmental risk. The project concluded that: 
By failing to address systemic environmental risks, Basel III is arguably overlooking an 
important source of risk to the financial system and broader economy, despite its overriding 
objective of guaranteeing banking stability and sustainability. Because financial stability is a 
public good, regulation has a role to play to ensure that environmental risks do not threaten 
financial stability.150 
Moreover, the value of incorporating climate change risks in the financial system generally, 
not just in relation to Basel III, has been recognised more widely by other researchers.151 This 
literature and the UNEP FI and CISL project propose suggestions as to how to approach such 
integration.152 If prudential regulation on climate finance is integrated into Basel III (or in 
future iterations of the framework), this will have implications for Guyana as the Bank Of 
Guyana intends to complete Basel III implementation by end-2019 and so it would likely 
implement any changes to the framework.153 
3.2.4. Renewable Energy Targets and Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Setting targets and standards can provide an enabling environment for mobilising finance, 
because if targets or standards are set, then resources are more likely to be allocated to 
achieving the targets and standards. Guyana committed unconditionally to the ‘rapid 
expansion of a renewable energy supply’ in its NDC,154 with a conditional commitment to 
relying on 100% renewable energy by 2025 if ‘adequate and timely financial support’ can be 
accessed or is provided. 155  This condition appears to not have been met, as recently 
government officials stated that the 100% by 2025 target may need to be revised as a result of  
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/1063/106302.htm> accessed 12 August 
2019; BIS, ‘Yves Mersch: Climate Change and Central Banking’ (27 November 2018) 
<www.bis.org/review/r181128b.htm> accessed 12 August 2019; European Central Bank – Banking 
Supervision, ‘We Need to Ensure Resilience to Climate-change Risk’ (15 May 2019) 
<www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/interviews/date/2019/html/ssm.in190515~d1ab906d59.en.html> 
accessed 12 August 2019. 
149 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems (Bank for International Settlements 2010, revised 2011). 
150 Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership and UNEP Finance Initiative, Stability and Sustainability 
in Banking Reform: Are Environmental Risks Missing in Basel III? (CISL and UNEP FI 2014) 25. 
151 Eg Paolo D’Orazio, Lilit Popyan and Pierre Monnin, ‘Prudential Regulation Can Help in Tackling Climate 
Change’ (Council on Economic Policies, 13 February 2019) <www.cepweb.org/prudential-regulation-can-help-
in-tackling-climate-change> accessed 8 August 2019; Kern Alexander, ‘Can Banking Regulation Address 
Climate Change?’ (Milken Institute Review, 18 June 2019) <www.milkenreview.org/articles/can-banking-
regulation-address-climate-change> accessed 8 August 2019. 
152  Eg Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership and UNEP Finance Initiative (n 150); D’Orazio, 
Popyan and Monnin (n 151); Alexander (n 151). 
153  International Monetary Fund, Guyana: 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Guyana (September 2019) IMF Country Report No 19/296, 14. 
154 Government of Guyana (n 101) 10. 
155 ibid 6, 10-11. 
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the significant financial resources, infrastructure, capacity building, legislative changes, and 
policy implementation that would be required by 2025.156 
Four key assumptions were made in the NDC in relation to financial support for the target.157 
The first assumption that Guyana and Norway continue to renew and extend their bilateral 
agreement has been met.158 Second, the GCF was to be fully operationalised and started to 
have disbursing funding from 2016; the GCF is operational and disbursing funds. One project 
has been approved so far by the GCF that aims to catalyse private sector investment for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects across the developing world, including 
Guyana.159 There are two further projects in the pipeline that may be submitted to the GCF 
Board for consideration in the future:160 a project on unlocking the potential of Guyana’s 
inland and mangrove forests to further reduce emissions and to build resilience to climate 
change, 161  and a project on enhancing coastal resilience against climate change by the 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre,162 which includes activities in Guyana.163 
The third assumption was that small island developing states, and in particular coastal low-
lying countries such as Guyana, receive preferential access and special consideration in 
access to financing. The fourth assumption was that REDD+ and renewable energy 
programmes and projects will be resourced in a predictable, adequate and timely manner. 
These two final assumptions are more difficult to assess. Arguably the GRIF ensures that 
REDD+ projects are resourced in a predictable, adequate and timely manner as a result of the 
Administrative Agreement.164 But, as is clear from the recent government statement, it is 
unlikely that the Government of Guyana considers all these assumptions to be adequately 
met, as it is likely it will revise its renewable energy target. 
Renewable portfolio standards are regulations or policy instruments that require increased 
renewable energy production by setting a minimum amount of electricity that needs to be 
delivered from specified sources.165 There is no evidence of such standards in Guyana. There 
has been some criticism of such standards; they can distract policy makers from ‘addressing 
the tangible legal, regulatory, and economic obstacles faced by developers of renewable 
power projects’ and that ‘on its own would accomplish little more than a symbolic victory for 
advocates of renewable energy and climate change mitigation’.166 A similar argument could 
 
156 Ministry of the President, ‘100 Percent Renewable Energy by 2025 Target to be Reviewed’ Department of 
Public Information News (3 August 2018) <https://dpi.gov.gy/100-percent-renewable-energy-by-2025-target-to-
be-reviewed> accessed 21 July 2019. 
157 Government of Guyana (n 101) 11. 
158 Section 3.1.1. 
159  GCF, ‘Project FP038 Geeref Next’ (2018) <www.greenclimate.fund/projects/fp038> accessed 1 August 
2019. 
160 European Investment Bank, Funding Proposal. FP038: GEEREF NeXt (GCF 2017); GCF, ‘Country Profiles: 
Guyana’ (2019) <www.greenclimate.fund/countries/guyana> accessed 1 August 2019. 
161  Conservation International, Concept Note: Unlocking the Potential of Guyana’s Inland and Mangrove 
Forests to further Reduce Emissions and to Build Resilience to Climate Change (GCF 2018). 
162 See Section 3.2.1 for more information on this Centre. 
163  Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre, Concept Note: Enhancing Coastal Resilience Against 
Climate Change (GCF 2016). 
164 Section 3.1.1. 
165  Eg Trent Berry and Mark Jaccard, ‘The Renewable Portfolio Standard: Design Considerations and an 
Implementation Survey’ (2001) 29 Energy Policy 263, 263. 
166 Jim Rossi, ‘The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard’ (2010) 42(5) Connecticut Law Review 
1425, 1450. 
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be applied to renewable energy targets generally. They can remain useful nonetheless as part 
of the complementary mix of financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities.167 
3.2.5. Measurement and Metrics 
Tracking climate finance flows poses a challenge as the climate finance landscape is very 
fragmented 168 – this is not wholly unexpected as fragmentation is an inherent structural 
characteristic of current international relations.169 This fragmentation is as a result of: the 
myriads of different sources and flows of climate finance, including from both private and 
public actors at different governance levels, and financial flows between countries and in-
country;170 mechanisms mobilising climate finance comprise both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches;171 and there has been a growth in recent years in non-traditional donors through 
increased South-South finance.172 This fragmentation of the climate finance landscape is, at 
least in part, a positive attribute,173 as it is a symptom of the many different opportunities that 
exist and are starting to be explored. Similarly, in the Guyanese context the preceding 
sections have demonstrated that there are different sources of financial flows. 
For the purpose of this article, the focus is on the tracking of climate finance facilitated by 
financial mechanisms, as facilitative modalities do not necessarily directly mobilise or 
leverage climate finance but help provide the enabling environment.174 There does not seem 
to be a centralised mechanism or initiative for tracking finance flows in-country, but instead 
the different financial mechanisms often have reporting requirements that does make it 
possible to track them individually. For example, there is a record of the financial flows as a 
result of GRIF in the Norway and Guyana climate and forest partnership175 and books of  
167 Eg Berry and Jaccard (n 165); George Buchman, ‘The Effectiveness of Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Banding and Carve-outs in Supporting High-cost Types of Renewable Electricity’ (2011) 39(7) Energy Policy 
4105; Ingmar Ritzenhofen, John R Birge and Stefan Spinler, ‘The Structural Impact of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards and Feed-in Tariffs on Electricity Markets’ (2016) 255(1) European Journal of Operational Research 
224. 
168 Eg Manish Bapna and Heather McGray, 'Financing Adaptation to a Warmer World: Opportunities for 
Innovation and Experimentation' in Lael Brainard, Abigail Jones and Nigel Purvis (eds), Climate Change and 
Global Poverty (Brookings Institution Press 2009) 10; Jonathan Pickering, Carola Betzold and Jakob 
Skovgaard, 'Editorial. Special Issue: Managing Fragmentation and Complexity in the Emerging System of 
International Climate Finance' (2017) 17(1) International Environmental Agreements 1, 5-8; Roberts and 
Weikmans (n 21). 
169 F Zelli and H van Asselt, ‘The Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance: Causes, 
Consequences, and Responses’ (2013) 13(3) Global Environmental Politics 1, 3. 
170 Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Climate Finance and its Governance: Moving to a Low Carbon Economy through 
Socially Responsible Financing’ (2009) 58(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 597, 601. 
171 Roberts and Weikmans (n 21) 131; Zahar, Climate Change Finance and International Law (n 20) 16. 
172 Eg the Republic of Korea and Panama contributed money to GCF (GCF, ‘Resource Mobilization (2019) 
<www.greenclimate.fund/how-we-work/resource-mobilization> accessed 12 August 2019); and China pledged 
USD 3 billion in late 2015 to combat climate change in developing countries (Ma Tianjie, ‘China Upgrades 
Climate Aid to the Global South’ chinadialogue (20 September 2017) 
<www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10086-China-upgrades-climate-aid-to-the-global-south> 
accessed 12 August 2019). 
173 Eg Ken MacClune, 'Financing from the Ground Up - Experiences in Adaptation Finance from Southeast 
Asia' (Adaptation Watch, October 2017) <www.adaptationwatch.org/#our-publications> accessed 15 January 
2018. 
174 Section 2.3. 
175 GRIF Steering Committee, ‘Operational Manual: Guyana REDD-Plus Investment Fund (GRIF)’ (12 May 
2011) 16-17, 
<www.guyanareddfund.org/images/stories/pdffiles/GRIF%20Operational%20Manual%20Version%201.0.pdf> 
accessed 12 August 2019. 
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accounts for the Environmental Trust Fund, which are subject to examination and audit at any 
time, need to be kept.176 
Similarly, there is no central initiative measuring and reporting the outcomes and impacts of 
the financial mechanisms, though there are again some examples of individual measurements. 
For example, the Norway and Guyana climate and forest partnership requires reporting again 
performance indicators 177  and the CDM project requires measuring of greenhouse gas 
emissions to an extent in order to demonstrate that they are additional that would occur in the 
absence of the certified project activity.178 The latter example is a clear demonstration of the 
limits of any measurements and metrics, as assumptions in relation to additionality ‘are often 
not substantiated with credible, documented evidence’.179 
3.3. Climate Finance Law in Guyana 
This section has presented evidence of both financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities 
implemented in Guyana. In relation to the former, there are opportunities for in-country 
finance, such as the Environmental Trust Fund,180 but most are currently aimed at facilitating 
finance from other countries to Guyana, such as the REDD+ Investment Fund, grants from 
developed countries,181 and tax incentives for renewable energy activities.182 There are some 
proposals to increase the number of financial mechanisms to enable climate finance resources 
in-country, including certain tax incentives183 and feed-in tariffs.184 The legal forms of these 
various mechanisms vary, though most are either implemented through national legislation or 
established by contracts. 
There are fewer facilitative modalities than financial mechanisms implemented, though they 
are ‘just as important as financial mechanisms, so regulators need to give equal attention to 
creating legal and policy environments that support them’. 185  The limited facilitative 
modalities that are present either do not have a legal form or, in one case, is set out in a 
policy document –across other international case studies, research has been shown that the 
legal forms of facilitative modalities can range from national legislation to contractual 
arrangements.186 
4. Tensions and Synergies between Climate Finance Law and the Financing 
of Oil Discovery and Production 
The Legal Analytical Framework of Climate Finance Options is now applied within the 
context of oil exploration and production to identify possible synergies or tensions with 
Guyanese climate finance law. An evaluation of the extent of these is beyond the scope of 
this article, as again the focus is instead limited to scoping the existence of them. Even  
176 Environmental Protection Act, s 65. 
177 Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance (n 67) 20-22. 
178 Kyoto Protocol, art 12(5). 
179  Lambert Schneider, ‘Assessing the Additionality of CDM Projects Practical Experiences and Lessons 
Learned’ (2009) 9(3) Climate Policy 242, 243. 
180 Section 3.1.1. 
181 Section 3.1.1. 
182 Section 3.1.3. 
183 Section 3.1.3. 
184 Section 3.1.5. 
185 Bowman and Steenmans, Climate Finance Law (n 24) 16. 
186 Bowman (n 24) 40. 
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though the Framework was developed for reviewing climate finance law implementation, it is 
applied within the context of oil production. This is to limit the types of finance options for 
oil discovery and production reviewed in this article, as there are many more and different 
actors and instruments that would need to be considered if undertaking a holistic review. 
4.1. Financial Mechanisms 
Not all the financial mechanisms of the Legal Analytical Framework are relevant within the 
oil context, because they are specific in their application and can only be considered within 
the climate finance context; such as carbon pricing and feed-in tariffs. The other mechanisms 
not considered and reasons why as part of the scoping review are highlighted in Table 4. 
There is evidence of a number of financial mechanisms supporting oil exploration and 
production, with the mechanisms present generally in tension with climate finance options, 
though there are possible synergies, as discussed in the following subsections. 
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Blended 
finance 
Green investment 
banks 
N/A – there is no equivalent to consider within the oil 
industry 
Climate Trust Funds T / S Sovereign Wealth Fund ✓     
Guarantees & 
insurance 
No evidence of any requirements in Guyana existing in 
relation to environmental protection for oil companies. 
Currently many companies self-insure 
Grants & loans T 
Guyana Petroleum Resources 
Governance and Management 
Project 
   ✓  
PPPs & CDM T / S Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Policy Framework   ✓   
Carbon 
pricing 
Carbon & coal taxes N/A – these would be a financial hurdle to the oil industry 
and be a clear synergy with climate finance, but none exist as 
already discussed in Section 3.1.2 
Emissions trading 
systems 
Tax credits & 
incentives 
Investment & 
production tax credits T 
Some foreign tax credits 
available  ✓    
Tax incentives for 
green activity T 
Modification of tax laws 
permitted ✓     
Tax holidays for up to ten 
years for certain petroleum 
exploration, extraction, and 
refining activities creating 
employment 
✓     
Petroleum capital expenditure 
allowance may be claimed ✓     
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Green bonds N/A – there is no equivalent to consider within the oil industry 
Feed-in tariffs N/A – there is no equivalent to consider within the oil industry 
Remove fossil fuel subsidies T Fossil fuels are subsidised   ✓   
Table 4. Non-exhaustive overview of possible synergies and tensions of financial mechanisms for oil 
exploration and production with climate finance options in Guyana. If there is a synergy or tension, 
this indicates the mechanism is present for oil exploration and production. 
4.1.1. Blended Finance 
At the start of 2019, Guyana assented the Natural Resource Fund Act,187 which establishes a 
sovereign wealth fund to be called the Natural Resource Fund (NRF). Sovereign wealth funds 
are government-owned investment vehicles that are ‘typically funded by commodity export 
revenues or the transfer of assets directly from official foreign-exchange reserves’.188 They 
are usually set up to stabilise government and export revenues, accumulate savings for future 
generations in resource-rich countries to offset the future lack of natural resources, and/or 
manage foreign reserves.189 The purpose of the NRF is 
to manage the natural resource wealth of Guyana for the present and future benefit of 
the people in an effective and efficient manner by – 
(a) ensuring that volatility in natural resource revenues do not lead to volatile public 
spending; 
(b) ensuring that natural resource revenues do not lead to a loss of economic 
competitiveness; 
(c) fairly transferring natural resource wealth across generations to ensure that future 
generations benefit from natural resource wealth; and 
(d) using natural resource wealth to finance national development priorities including 
any initiative aimed at realising an inclusive green economy.190 
The latter purpose ties in with climate action; ‘inclusive green economy’ is defined as ‘an 
economy that improves human well-being and builds social equity while reducing 
environmental risks and scarcities’.191 There is thus a possible synergy with climate finance 
law as the purpose of the NRF set out in (d) can include financing climate mitigation and 
adaptation actions, as equity and improvement of human well-being should be integral  
187 Natural Resource Fund Act (Act 12 of 2019). 
188 Shams Butt and others, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force in Corporate Finance’(2008) 
20(1) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 73, 73. See also: Bader Alhashel, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A 
Literature Review’ (2015) 78 Journal of Economics and Business 1, 2. See also: Roland Beck and Michael 
Fidora, ‘The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets’ (2008) 43(6) Intereconomics 349, 
349. 
189 Joshua Aizenman and Reuven Glick, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling Blocks or Stepping Stones to 
Financial Globalization?’ [2007] CPBS Annual Report 11, 11; Beck and Fidora (n 188) 349; Danyel Reiche, 
‘Sovereign Wealth Funds as a New Instrument of Climate Protection Policy? A Study of Norway as a Pioneer 
of Ethical Guidelines for Investment Policy’ (2010) 35 Energy 3569, 3569; Dariusz Urban, ‘The Role of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds in Global Management of Excess Foreign Exchange Reserves’ (2011) 14(2) 
Comparative Economic Research 143, 144; Alhashel (n 188) 2; Qiang Wang and Rongrong Li, ‘Impact of 
Cheaper Oil on Economic System and Climate Change: A SWOT Analysis’ (2016) Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 925, 926. 
190 ibid s 3(2). 
191 ibid s 2. 
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dimensions of these.192 This possible synergy is further emphasised by the intended limited 
uses of this fund: withdrawals from the NRF 
shall be used only to finance 
(a) national development priorities including any initiative aimed at realising an 
inclusive green economy; and  
(b) essential projects that are directly related to ameliorating the effect of a major 
natural disaster.193 
Inherent tensions with climate finance law remain, as deposits into the NRF include revenues 
from the production of petroleum resources,194 which can contribute to climate change.195 
NRF funding of oil extraction projects is not excluded if it is argued that would be used to 
develop a green economy and avoid a major natural disaster. There is evidence that this is a 
possibility as the Officer at the Ministry of Natural Resources has stated that the green 
economy and oil extraction are not incompatible.196 Moreover, there is also a risk that oil 
development projects risk locking-in high-carbon industrial activities and are thus 
incompatible with Guyana’s ambition to use 100 per cent renewable energy by 2025.197 
Guarantees and insurance instruments are considered in this article in relation to 
environmental protection. Currently, there is no policy in Guyana that provides guidance on 
whether oil exploration and production companies can self-insure or require an 
internationally recognised insurance policy. 198  For example, currently the ExxonMobil 
contract with the Government of Guyana allows the company to self-insure, meaning that it 
will handle any liabilities resulting from, for example, a possible oil spill. 199  There are 
opportunities for these to exist in Guyana, such as MIGA200 political risk guarantees for oil 
and gas investments that can support companies in assessing a project’s potential 
environmental risks and impacts.201 
 
192  Eg W Neil Adger, ‘Climate Change, Human Well-being and Insercurity’ (2010) 15(2) New Political 
Economy 275, 286-288; Marc Fleurbaey and others, ‘Sustainable Development and Equity’ in O Edenhofer and 
others (eds), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
287; William F Lamb and Julia K Steinberger, ‘Human Well-being and Climate Change Mitigation’ (2017) 8 
WIREs Climate Change 1, 1, 5-6 and 10. 
193 Natural Resource Fund Act 2019, s 22(2). 
194 ibid s 21(1)-(3). 
195 Section 1. 
196 Carinya Sharples, ‘Guyana Seeks Offshore Oil Wealth in a Green Economy’ Mongabay (21 November 2017) 
<https://news.mongabay.com/2017/11/guyana-seeks-offshore-oil-wealth-in-a-green-economy> accessed 16 
December 2019. 
197 Siân Bradley, Glada Lahn and Steve Pye, ‘Carbon Risk and Resilience: How Energy Transition is Changing 
the Prospects for Developing Countries with Fossil Fuels’ (Chatham House 2018) 47. 
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-07-12-carbon-risk-resilience-bradley-
lahn-pye.pdf 
198 Kaieteur News, ‘Demand Comprehensive Insurance from all Oil Companies – World Bank’ Kaieteur News 
(2 December 2018) <www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/12/02/demand-comprehensive-insurance-from-all-oil-
companies-world-bank> accessed 12 August 2019; Kaieteur News, ‘Oil Spill Readiness … Insurance Policy a 
Must for Operators’ Kaieteur News (12 February 2019) <www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2019/02/12/oil-spill-
readiness-insurance-policy-a-must-for-operators-going-forward-energy-dept-head> accessed 12 August 2019. 
199 ibid. 
200 Section 3.1.1. 
201 MIGA, ‘MIGA: Securing Oil and Gas Investments’ (2015) 1 <www.miga.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/oil-
gas-brief.pdf> accessed 12 July 2019. 
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There is evidence of grants for oil production. Despite the World Bank stating that it will no 
longer finance upstream oil and gas production,202 the World Bank approved a grant of USD 
20 million for the Guyana Petroleum Resources Governance and Management Project.203 
This project will support the enhancement of legal and institutional frameworks, and the 
strengthening of the capacity of key institutions to manage the oil and gas sector in 
Guyana.204 The World Bank in it its statement did state that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ it 
would consider giving finance to poorest countries ‘where there is a clear benefit in terms of 
energy access for the poor and the project fits within the countries’ Paris Agreement 
commitments’.205 Moreover, it also expressed its intention to ‘continue to provide technical 
assistance that helps client countries strengthen the transparency, governance, institutional 
capacity and regulatory environment for their energy sector – including oil and gas’.206 So, 
even though climate change mitigation only constitutes two per cent of the project and the 
extent to which supporting oil production actually aligns with Guyana’s Paris Agreement 
commitments is debatable,207 the project remains within the World Bank’s funding remit. 
The CDM is not relevant within the oil industry context, but PPPs generally are. The Public-
Private Partnership Policy Framework encourages PPPs to be adopted for conventional 
electricity sectors in addition to renewable electricity sectors. 208 There is thus a possible 
synergy as the aim is to encourage PPPs generally, but simultaneously any PPPs set up to 
facilitate oil exploration and production would be in conflict with the aims of climate 
mitigation and adaptation. 
4.1.2. Tax Credits and Incentives 
In comparison to tax incentives for green activity, more exist for oil exploration and 
production,209 including permitted modification of tax laws, a petroleum capital expenditure 
allowance, and tax holidays. There is thus no additional – and even arguably less – incentive 
for financing climate action in comparison to oil exploration and production in the form of 
tax incentives. 
First, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 210  provides in section 51 that 
modification of tax laws is permitted: 
(1) The Minister assigned responsibility for finance may, by order, which shall be 
subject to affirmative resolution of the National Assembly, direct that any or all of  
202  The World Bank, ‘World Bank Group Announcements at One Planet Summit’ (12 December 2017) 
<www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-
summit> accessed 29 July 2019. 
203  The World Bank, ‘Guyana Petroleum Resources Governance and Management Project’ (2019) 
<http://projects.worldbank.org/P166730?lang=en> accessed 29 July 2019. 
204 ibid. 
205 The World Bank (n 202). 
206 The World Bank and International Development Association, ‘Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed 
Credit in the amount of SDR 14,300,000 (US$20 Million Equivalent) to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana 
for a Guyana Petroleum Resources Governance and Management Project’ (1 March 2019) Report No. 
PAD3022, 6 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/943971554170648125/pdf/Guyana-Petroleum-
Resources-Governance-and-Management-Project.pdf> accessed 6 August 2019. 
207 ibid. See also text to n 197. 
208 Section 3.1.1. 
209 Overview of all taxes relevant to oil and gas industry in Guyana: EY, Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 2019 
(EY 2019) 264-268. 
210 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, Cap. 65:10 (Act 3 of 1986). 
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the written laws mentioned in subsection (2) shall not apply to, or in relation to, a 
licensee where the licensee has entered into a production sharing agreement with 
the Government of Guyana. 
(2) The written laws referred to in subsection (1) are – 
(a) the Income Tax Act; 
(b) the Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Act; 
(c) the Corporation Tax Act; and 
(d) the Property Tax Act. 
A licensee is defined as the holder of a petroleum prospecting licence or a petroleum 
production licence.211 
Second, section 33B of the Income Tax Act212 provides that when calculating chargeable 
income for corporation tax purposes, a petroleum capital expenditure allowance may be 
claimed from the first year of production.  
Third, similarly to tax holidays granted for certain renewable energy activities, 213  tax 
holidays for up to ten years are also granted for activities creating new employment in the 
field of ‘petroleum exploration, extraction and refining’. 214  This means that there is no 
additional incentive for renewable energy activities, as the same exists for oil exploration and 
production. 
There are some available foreign tax credits as a result of double tax treaties with Canada,215 
the UK, 216  and Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) countries. 217  For example, the 
Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital Gains, contained in The Double Taxation Relies (Taxes on Income) (Guyana) Order 
1992, allows tax payable under Guyanese laws to be a tax credit against any UK tax (subject 
to provisions in the Order).218 
The above discussion also highlights the overlaps that exist within the Legal Analytical 
Framework for Climate Finance, as several of the credits and incentives below could be 
considered fossil fuel subsidies. 
 
211 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, s 2(1). 
212 Income Tax Act, Cap: 81:01 (Act 17 of 1929). 
213 Section 3.1.3. 
214 Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Act, Cap. 81:02 (Act 16 of 1951), s 2(1)(b)(iii). 
215 Convention Between Canada and the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (15 October 1985), art 20(2). 
216 The Double Taxation Relies (Taxes on Income) (Guyana) Order 1992. 
217 Agreement among the Governments of the Member States of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits or Gains and 
Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment (Barbados, 7 July 1995; in force 30 
November 1994). Guyana ratified the Agreement on 26 November 1997. 
218 The Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Guyana) Order 1992, art 24(1). 
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4.1.3. Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Guyana subsidises the energy sector;219 between 2008 and 2014 the average energy subsidy 
for fuel was 1.3% of GDP.220 As discussed in Section 3.1.6, these are not expected to be 
removed soon as a highlighted by a recent statement by the Guyanese Minister of Finance. 
4.2. Facilitative Modalities 
There is evidence of facilitative modalities for oil exploration and production as set out in 
Table 5. They are predominantly in tension with climate finance options to the extent that oil 
exploration and production activities are generally in conflict with climate change mitigation 
and adaptation activities.221 Whether the modalities are therefore in synergy or tension is 
therefore not considered for each individually, as the same argument would be presented 
repetitively.  
Similar to the financial mechanisms, not all facilitative modalities are considered within the 
oil exploration and production context. For example, corporate conduct and prudential 
regulation and banks are not considered as these apply to companies generally, including 
those within the oil industry, and are therefore already discussed in Section 3. 
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Knowledge 
sharing & 
capacity 
building 
Centralised information 
services ✓ 
Data and information is received 
by the Guyana Geology and 
Mines Commission 
✓     
National Petroleum Data 
Repository is to be set up    ✓  
Matchmaking & training 
schemes ✓ 
TOTALTEC Oilfield Services 
provides training for Guyanese 
technicians and engineers 
    ✓ 
Public lectures organised by the 
Guyana Oil & Gas Association     ✓ 
Idea Labs x No evidence N/A 
Corporate 
conduct 
General GHG emissions 
reporting 
N/A – reflects discussion in Section 3.2.2, as this was in 
relation to companies generally, including those within oil  
219 Gabriel Di Bella and others, ‘Energy Subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean: Stocktaking and Policy 
Challenges’ (2015) IMF Working Paper WP/15/30, 20 <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1530.pdf> 
accessed 23 July 2019. 
220 Estefanía Marchán, Ramón Espinasa and Ariel Yépez-Garcia, The Other Side of the Boom: Energy Prices 
and Subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean During the Super-Cycle (IDB 2017) 64. The 2011-2013 
estimate for subsidies for fuels is 1.7% of GDP according to Di Bella and others (n 219) 10. Note: more recent 
estimates are currently not available online. 
221 Section 1. 
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Climate-related 
corporate disclosures 
industry 
Prudential regulation & banks 
N/A – reflects discussion in Section 3.2.3, as this was in 
relation to companies generally, including those within oil 
industry 
Measurement 
& metrics 
Tracking finance flows 
in-country ✓* 
No central mechanism but this is 
required for some financial 
mechanisms 
Legal form 
depends on the 
particular 
mechanism 
Outcomes & impacts of 
financial mechanisms 
(e.g. green bonds) 
x No evidence N/A 
Table 5. Non-exhaustive overview of facilitative modalities for oil exploration and production with 
climate finance options in Guyana: present (✓), absent (x), present in certain circumstances (✓*). 
4.2.1. Knowledge Sharing and Capacity Building 
Similarly to the climate finance context, there is recognition that 
‘As a new oil and gas producer, Guyana lacks the policy, legal and regulatory 
frameworks and institutional capacity needed to maximize the benefits from expected 
oil revenues and minimize downside risks associated with oil revenues and growth of 
the sector’.222 
There is some evidence of ongoing and planned initiatives aimed at sharing knowledge and 
building capacity, though there is no evidence of any idea labs. 
There are large volumes of oil and gas information and data being generated and shared by 
companies as required by their contracts and licenses.223 For example, the contracts between 
the Government of Guyana and Repsol, and the Government of Guyana and Esso Exploration 
and Production Guyana, CNOOC Nexen Petroleum Guyana, and Hess Guyana Exploration 
requires 
[a]ll data, well logs, maps, magnetic tapes, cuts of cores and cutting samples and all 
other geological and geophysical information … and all geological, technical, financial 
and economic reports, studies and analyses generated … shall be submitted to the 
Minister in accordance with the [Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Regulations 
1986].224 
The Guyana Geology and Mines Commission is, however, being overwhelmed by all this 
petroleum data, as there are currently no facilities, personnel, or equipment to support this 
 
222 The World Bank and International Development Association (n 206) 9. 
223 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, s 70(2)(o). 
224 Petroleum Agreement between the Minister Responsible for Petroleum Representing the Government of the 
Republic of Guyana and Repsol Exploración S.A. (14 May 2013), art 9.1(b). Available on: 
<https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1215811760/download/pdf>; Petroleum Agreement 
between the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and Esso Exploration and Production Guyana 
Limited, CNOOC Nexen Petroleum Guyana Limited, Hess Guyana Exploration Limited (27 June 2016) art 
9(1)(b). Available on: <https://gyeiti.org/wp-content/uploads/Petroleum-Agreement-Oct-7-2016.pdf>. 
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data management. 225  The Guyana Petroleum Resource Governance and Management 
Project226 will support the building of a new National Petroleum Data Repository in Guyana, 
which will collect and store existing data.227 This Repository has not yet been established. 
There are also examples of some matchmaking and training schemes. The Guyana Oil & Gas 
Association is a private sector organisation set up to promote a robust oil and gas industry 
and to advocate for comprehensive science-based policies and effective and transparent 
market principles.228 The Association organises public lectures – past topics have included, 
inter alia, corporate social responsibility in small oil producing states, cultural impact on 
safety in oil and gas, the structure, governance and legal aspects of sovereign wealth funds, 
and the establishment and maintenance of a viable and successful framework for oil and gas 
development in Guyana.229 
TOTALTEC Oilfield Services is a local Guyanese company created to support the oil and gas 
industry. Its main priority is as an educational vehicle in-country for the Guyanese 
technicians and engineers that the industry will be recruiting.230 TOTALTEC therefore has 
three key functions: (1) recruit, train, provide, and support qualified personnel for the oil and 
gas industry; (2) provide facilities and necessary supporting functions to fulfil its first 
function; and (3) form partnerships with companies.231 For example, there is currently a 
TOTALTEC Academy that combines classroom and practical training, which has the 
ambition to train at least 100 Guyanese annually, with the first Guyanese graduates having 
completed the training programme in 2019 as part of a joint project with Guyana Shore Base 
Inc, a Guyanese-owned shore base facility that supports the oil and gas industry in 
Guyana.232 
These knowledge sharing and capacity building activities and initiatives present neither 
synergies nor tensions with climate finance based on a desk-based review (beyond the 
already discussed tension that exists between climate finance and oil exploration and 
production generally and the possible synergy as a result of the NRF).233 There is potential 
for some more synergies through, for example, requiring climate mitigation commitments, 
such as carbon offsetting, by licensees.  
4.2.2. Measurement and Metrics 
Similar to discussions in Section 3.2.5 in relation to climate finance options, there is no 
centralised mechanism tracking financing for oil exploration and production. Again, there are  
225 The World Bank and International Development Association (n 206) 16-17. 
226 Section 4.1.1. 
227 The World Bank and International Development Association (n 206) 16-17. 
228 Guyana Oil & Gas Association, ‘Guyana Oil & Gas Association’ (2017) <http://goga.gy> accessed 6 August 
2019. 
229  Guyana Oil & Gas Association, ‘Public Lecturer Series’ (2017) <http://goga.gy/public-lecture-series> 
accessed 6 August 2019. 
230 TOTALTEX Oilfield Services, ‘Pioneering Guyanese Establishes Oilfield Support and Services Company’ 
Guyana Invest (2017/18) 40 <http://goinvest.gov.gy/wp-content/uploads/Invest-Guyana-2017.pdf> accessed 6 
August 2019. 
231 TOTALTEC Oilfield Services, ‘TOTALTEC Oilfield Services’ (2018) <www.totaltec-os.com> accessed 6 
August 2019. 
232 Charlie Cosad, ‘TOTALTEC Academy Graduates First of 120 Guyanese in Historic Drive to Ramp Up 
Supply Base Capacity’ (TOTALTEC Oilfield Services, 22 July 2019) <www.totaltec-os.com/post/totaltec-
academy-graduates-first-of-120-guyanese> accessed 8 August 2019. 
233 Section 4.1.1. 
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examples of tracking requirements in relation to individual mechanisms, such as the NRF 
requires the Bank of Guyana to ‘maintain proper books of accounts and records’ for the 
NRF. 234  There are, however, no requirements in relation to accounting for impacts and 
outcomes from the expenditure of funds from the NRF, which would help provide insight 
into its effectiveness. 
5. Conclusion 
The wider contribution of this article is to the emerging field of climate finance law by 
reviewing the Guyanese experience to date. This article adopted the Legal Analytical 
Framework of Climate Finance Options developed by Bowman 235 to structure a scoping 
review of climate finance law in Guyana. The non-exhaustive review demonstrated that there 
is evidence of both financial mechanisms and facilitative modalities implemented through 
different legal forms that can help create an enabling legal and regulatory environment for 
climate finance in Guyana.236 Having provided an overview of the climate finance options, 
further research is now needed on their adequacy and effectiveness – and the development of 
requisite metrics needed to measure these – to investigate whether these actually result in an 
enabling environment, and, if so, how to motivate their wider uptake. 
This article has also reviewed a number of climate finance options that are not yet 
implemented. The gaps in financial mechanisms include a green investment bank, carbon 
pricing mechanisms, green bonds, feed-in tariffs, and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, 
while the facilitative modalities in relation to corporate conduct, prudential regulation, and 
measurement and metrics are not yet taken up. Within the context of significant additional 
climate financing needed in Guyana, these present opportunities to explore further to assess 
their appropriateness within the Guyanese context to enable the mobilisation and leveraging 
of financial resources. 
The other contribution of this article was the identification of possible tensions and synergies 
with finance options for oil exploration and production. There is a fundamental conflict 
between the funding of activities that produce greenhouse gas emissions, which result from 
oil exploration and production activities, and activities mitigating climate change by aiming 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There are a number of financing options – in particular 
grants, tax incentives, and subsidies – which directly counteract some of the climate finance 
options, though some financing mechanisms for climate adaptation and mitigation activities 
originate from oil exploration and production, particularly the NRF. The effect of both green 
and brown finance simultaneously impedes and limits the development of an enabling legal 
and regulatory environment for climate finance. Further research should investigate the 
feasibility of and opportunities for ‘greening’ the identified brown finance and the extent to 
which this is possible. 
Financing is, however, only one of the many ‘formidable challenges’ faced by Guyana in 
relation to climate change237 and also more widely; Guyana is also focused on improving its 
education, healthcare, and infrastructure.238 Climate finance in Guyana therefore needs to be  
234 Natural Resource Fund Act, s 37. 
235 Bowman (n 24). 
236 See text to n 50 and 56. 
237 Catherine Hickey and Tony Weis, ‘The Challenge of Climate Change Adaptation in Guyana’ (2012) 4(1) 
Climate and Development 66, 66, 72 and 73. 
238 Text to n 12 - 13. 
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further investigated within the wider Guyanese economic and social context. Such research 
will require critical analysis of equity and justice dimensions of climate finance law, and of 
the resultant balancing of needs that may be required in addressing the challenges facing 
Guyana. Questions of how to achieve effective, adequate, and scaled up climate finance 
flows while also embedding equity and justice principles are not limited to Guyana, but 
present profound challenges globally. 
